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ARTICLE

The Stewardship of Trust
in the Global Value Chaint
KISHANTHI PARELLA*

Globalgovernance has not yet caught up with the globalization of business. As a
result, our headlines provide daily accounts of the extent and consequences of these
an
"governancegaps. " The ability of corporationsto evade state control also contributesto
Some
states.
unusual, even frightening, phenomenon: corporations are governing like
governancefunctions traditionallydelivered by state actorsare now increasingly undertaken
by transnationalcorporations. One area that is experiendng this substitution is dispute
resolution of human rights. Corporationsand other business enterprises, individualy or
collectivey, are creating a variety ofgrievance mechanisms to address human rights and
other conflicts associated- even caused - by their business activities.
When these roles arefufilled by state actors, we rely on proceduralfairnessto guide,
even discline, decision-makers. Proceduralfairnessimproves ourfaith in decision-makers
and their institutions even if we might disagree with the outcomes reached. What does
proceduralfairness mean when it is undertaken by a corporationproviding quasi-public
governance? What factors might improve its disczplining potential on corporations and
increase the likelihood that the watchingpublic, local andglobal, might accept the outcomes
reached? Current guidance to corporations is based upon public law traditions.
Consequently, success has been limited because these approachesfail to address the
characteristicsand dynamics ofgovernance by the business sector.
By contrast, this Article offers a newframeworkforproceduralfairnessthat is based
upon a neglected but signficant source: contract law. This framework draws upon
interdiszplinary research on relationalcontracts to develop a strategy for trust-building
that can improve the quality ofgovernanceperformed by the transnationalbusiness sector.

tAwarded the 2014 Lewis Prize for Excellence in Legal Scholarship by the Francis Lewis Center
at Washington and Lee School of Law.
* Associate Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. J.D., LL.M in International
& Comparative Law, Duke Law School; M. Phil. in International Relations, University of Cambridge;
B.A., University of Western Ontario. I am grateful for feedback received at the Annual Research Forum
of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) hosted by Northwestern University School of
Law, Biennial Research Conference of ASIL's International Economic Law Interest Group, annual
meeting of the junior International Law Scholars Association, and the Indiana University Maurer
School of Law. Special thanks for detailed feedback from Jose Alvarez, Christopher Bruner, Christina
Sautter, and Paul Stephan.
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INTRODUCTION

Many transactions in the marketplace benefit from trust. Trust can
lower the cost of transacting and increase the odds of future exchanges
between parties. Unfortunately, it is not easy to build trust, especially when
the marketplace is global, the parties are strangers, and their interactions
occur under conditions of doubt, suspicion and even violence. These are the
conditions in many global value chains (GVCs) through which transnational
corporations produce their goods.
Unsurprisingly, these GVCs are sites of recent conflict. In Papua New
Guinea, private security personnel employed by the world's largest gold
producer, Barrick Gold, were implicated in violence towards local residents.'
Violence continues to plague the oil-rich Niger Delta region and the
2
multinational oil companies operating there. In South Africa, violence also
broke out when fruit farm workers went on strike to protest their low
wages. 3 Many of these fruit farm workers occupy the lowest ranks of global
supply chains for multinational retail supermarkets.
Many of these conflicts are not new. What is new is that access to
4
remedies is not provided by the courts but by corporations. This situation
may seem surprising - even disturbing. It is further complicated by the fact
that the human rights abuses that occur are often associated - or even
caused - by the same corporations that are resolving the dispute and
offering remedies. The potential for abuse is high when a multinational
corporation decides the fate of a local villager in Indonesia or a factory
worker in Mexico.
These characteristics create two related challenges for dispute resolution
in the value chain: (a) Why would a local villager, factory worker or farmer
trust a grievance mechanism developed by a foreign corporation, especially
when this same corporation is often to blame for the grievances? and (b)

.

1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GOLD'S COSTLY DIVIDEND: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS OF PAPUA
NEW GUINEA'S PORGERA GOLD MINE (2011).
2. Daniel Balint-Kurti, NigerianAmy on AlertAmid Oil Unrest: Chevron Closes Two Flow Stations; Shell
Staff loaves, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2005, http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2005/09/24/nigerian army-on-alert amid oil-unrest; Chevron PipelineAttacked in Nigeria, WALL
92923
2 6 3 3 67
185.
01
0
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1
BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2013,
Workers,
Farm
at
3. South Africa Police Fire Rubber Bullets
57069
2
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 09
4. See, e.g., DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE? COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY-LED
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 27 (Emma Wilson & Emma Blackmote eds., 2013) [hereinafter DISPUTE
OR DIALOGUE]; Caroline Rees & David Vermijs, Mapping GrievanceMechanisms in the Business andHuman
Rights Arena (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, 2008); Human
Rights in the Mining & Metals Industry: Handling and Resolving Local Level Concerns & Grievances,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS (ICMM) (2009), http://www.icmm.com/document/691 [hereinafter ICMM]; IPIECA, Community Grievance Mechanisms in the Oil and Gas Industry:
A ManualforIplementing Operational-LevelGrievanceMechanisms and Designing CorporateFrameworks (2015).
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How do we reduce the risk that corporations will exploit these mechanisms
to advance their own interests?
This Article offers a framework for addressing these challenges when
corporations and other business enterprises create dispute resolution
mechanisms to address conflicts related to their business activity abroad.
When building institutional trust, the intuition is to turn to public law.
Public law's relevance is clear. The state must continually manage its
relationship with its citizenry and this relationship depends on public
perceptions of the processes by which the state and its representatives make
decisions that affect the general welfare of the citizenry. The movement for
procedural justice has long recognized the importance of trust for creating
fair processes.5
The public approach is reflected in the advice of the United Nations to
corporations that emphasizes the importance of trust for successful
company-led dispute resolution of human rights abuses. 6 Its particular
prescription for trust-building is stakeholder engagement. According to the
United Nations, corporations can facilitate trust in their dispute resolution
mechanisms by including a broad range of affected stakeholders - such as
community members, local NGOs, trade unions, laborers, and suppliers
in the design of dispute resolution mechanisms.7
Unfortunately, this advice is incomplete. This Article argues that the
missing piece is supplied by a neglected source: contract law. 8 This
revelation may seem as surprising as the reality that corporations are
addressing conflicts involving human rights. However, dealmakers and their
attorneys also worry about trust. They also confront the challenge of
building trust between unfamiliar, even hostile, parties. A rich literature
5. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 151 (1990).
6. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Princples on Business and Human
Rghts: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, ¶ 31(a), Human Rights

Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Prinileson
Business and Human Rights] (explaining that effective grievance mechanisms must be perceived as
legitimate, defined as "enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended").
An extensive literature discusses the importance of perceptions of legitimacy for institutional success.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When ILitgation Is Not the Only Wy: Consensus Building andMediationAs

Pubic Interest Lanyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37 (2002); Daniel M. Bodansky, The Legitimay of
InternationalGovernance: A Coming Challengefor InternationalEnvironmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596,

603 (1999) ("[Perceptions of legitimacy are an important basis of effectiveness and ...
whether
international environmental regimes are perceived as legitimate will play an important role in their longterm success."); Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 301 (2003);
TYLER, supra note 5, at 161.
7. Guiding Priniples on Business and Human Rights, supra note 6, at ¶ 31(h).
8. For example, studies recognizing the importance of stakeholder participation in institutional
design have relied on moral philosophy, political science, and social psychology to address risks of
stakeholder engagement. Contract law is usually not consulted. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing
Bespoke TransitionalJustice:A PluralistProcess Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 21-24 (2010).
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9
studies their strategies for overcoming these challenges. This insight is
particularly important because it not only recognizes the importance of trust
but also provides guidance on how to create trust between strangers in
0
situations where trust is low and interests are adverse.' This Article draws
upon contract theory to supplement the guidance of the United Nations and
other human rights bodies. Perhaps fittingly, the result is a "public-private"
framework for procedural fairness that addresses the "public-private"
phenomena of corporate actors addressing human rights abuses and other

conflicts.
The implications of this framework are considerable for addressing
human rights globally. Lawyers are usually tempted to answer the
accountability gap in international law with a robust adjudicative or semiadjudicative body that satisfies our notions of accountability. This
temptation to equate accountability with judicialization may result from a
belief that the use of a court or similar body will help legitimize the process
adopted and the outcomes reached.
This Article suggests a different pathway for accountability by
illustrating the benefits of decentralized, dialogue-based approaches to
address violations of human rights by corporations and other business
enterprises. This Article argues that the level of trust that stakeholders place
in a dispute resolution mechanism is not only a product of its attributes
during the operational stage. Instead, these mechanisms are perceived as
legitimate when the processes leading up to their creation - institutional
design - build trust between the stakeholders involved.
One may wonder why corporations are motivated to resolve disputes,
much less resolve them in ways that accord with procedural fairness. After
all, many corporations purposefully relocate to faraway places that are also
less regulated spaces where they can operate unfettered by host states or
home states alike." One reason is that this "accountability gap" has not gone
unnoticed and the increasing number of headlines documenting the
consequences of this accountability gap has led to various initiatives for
change. For example, in June 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted a
resolution by Ecuador and South Africa to consider an international legally
2
binding instrument addressing transnational business and human rights.' In
another example, the Working Group on an International Arbitration
Tribunal on Business and Human Rights has proposed an international
9. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,

1644-45 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interactionof.Formal
andinformal Contractingin Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).

10. See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9.
&

11. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, TransnationalCorporationsand PublicAccountability, 39 Gov'T

OPPOSITON 234, 239 (2004).
12. G.A. Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/26/22 (June 27, 2014).
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permanent tribunal to address human rights abuses by transnational
businesses.13
Corporations are also motivated to develop their own dispute resolution
mechanisms in order to demonstrate their willingness and capacity to
address these accountability concerns. They may need to engage in dispute
resolution in order to obtain financing or secure certain forms of
certification.1 4 Finally, it can benefit a corporation to invest in an effective
and trusted dispute resolution mechanism. Such a mechanism may allow
corporations to address issues early before these issues escalate into conflicts
imposing significant financial and reputational costs. In the words of a
Peruvian community leader, "[t]hey paid no attention to us when we raised
small problems, so we had to create a big one." 15 In order for these
mechanisms to work effectively, however, the potential disputants must
trust the mechanisms enough to use them.
This Article's project of creating fair processes for institutional design
builds on scholarship examining the legitimacy of global governance
institutions.' 6 The global administrative law movement's prescriptions
often based on legitimacy of public institutions - are valid and important
for governance by international bodies. Unfortunately, these prescriptions
are more challenging to apply when the governance is performed by
corporations, especially in the context of non-judicial forms of dispute
resolution.
This Article focuses on the potential for corporations and other
business actors to ameliorate some of the negative effects of their
transnational business activity. This is not a complete solution for all the
risks and abuses currently rampant in international production. It is also not
meant to serve as a substitute for public action, whether local or global.
Instead, it is offered as an avenue for improving current practices in

-

13. Claes Cronstedt et al., An InternationalArbitration Tribunal on Business & Human Rights
Reshaping the judiciag, https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Tribunal%20

Version%205.pdf.
14. Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, NarrowingtheAccountabiliyGap: TowardaNew Foreign
Investor-Accountaility Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 210 (2008).
15. DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting John Ruggie, Professor, Harvard
Kennedy School of Gov't, Keynote Address at Canadian Business for Social Responsibility: Just
Business: Why Companies Must Pay Attention to Human Rights (Nov. 5, 2009)).
16. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Lgitimay of Global Governance Institutions,

20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of GlobalAdministrativeLaw, 68 L. & CONT. PROBS. 15 (2005); Jost Dclbrtick, Exerising Public
Autority Beyond the State: TransnationalDemocrag and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 (2003); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimag ofinternationalGovernance:A Coming
Challengefor InternationalEnvironmentalLaw?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 602-03 (1999); see also Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The New [K/al-Mart Effect The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 913 (2007); Terry Macdonald & Kate Macdonald, Non-ElectoralAccountability in Global Pofitics:
StrengtheningDemocratic Control Within the Global GarmentJndustg, 17 EUR.J. INTL. L. 89 (2006).
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international business by examining the effects, motivations, and capacities
of business enterprises. 17 As such, it is consistent with similar recognition of
the importance of business sector participation in global governance under
8
the United Nations' Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework.'
The Article is organized as follows: Part I explains why corporations are
investing in dispute resolution and the importance of procedural fairness for
institutional design. Part II explains why current research on global
governance institutions does not address the problems confronted by
corporations regarding the design of their dispute resolution mechanisms.
Part III explains and applies a new framework for procedural fairness in the
institutional design of grievance mechanisms. Part IV considers the
implications of this framework for other stages in private institutional
development. Finally, Part V uses a global value chain analysis to explain the
applicability and limitations of using procedural fairness across value chains.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS SECTOR

I.

Increasingly, corporations and other business enterprises are
undertaking activities that we normally associate with a government actor.
9
They develop standards governing environmental and labor standards.'
20
They monitor human rights abuses. They are now starting to provide
remedies for a range of social ills caused by their business activities.
This rise in corporate-led institutional development may be undesirable.
Instead of the business sector, we may prefer that robust public institutions
fill these roles instead. The difficulty is that the globalization of business
occurred more swiftly and effectively than global governance. The
dispersion and fragmentation of global business, especially production,
across several borders challenges traditional, state-based forms of public
governance. This challenge is exacerbated when corporations concentrate
production in places where local government is an ineffective check on
corporate activity.

17. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 138

(2013).
18. John Ruggie (U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights), Report of the Special Representative ofthe Secretay-Generalon the Issue ofHuman Rights and Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises:Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Frameworkfor Business and Human

Rights, U.N. Human Rights Council, 189 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Framework]
(noting that this framework creates a distinct role for businesses "to respect human rights," primarily
through increased due diligence to "become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights
impacts").
19. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Toward a New 21st Century ParadgmforCorporate

Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN.J. INT'L L. 123 (2007); Vandenbergh, supra note 17, at 146.
20. Baker, supra note 19, at 123.
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These less regulated spaces give rise to several governance gaps that
reveal the limits of state-based regulation. Some of these governance gaps
are addressed by the corporations themselves. This section explains why
corporations are addressing one form of governance gap: accountability
through grievance mechanisms. It is necessary to understand these reasons
in order to appreciate the leverage points for improving the quantity and
quality of corporate-led institutional development. These reasons generally
fall into two categories: internal and external drivers for private governance.

A. ExternalDrivers: Why CompaniesMay Want a GrievanceMechanism
External drivers for institutional development are derived from growing
expectations of corporations that parallel their expansion on the world stage.
As the resources and footprint of the transnational business sector expands,
we expect more from them besides the pursuit of profit. At the very least,
there is an increasing expectation that corporations and other business
enterprises should curb the harmful effects of their own transnational
activity. 21
Consequently, national governments and international organizations are
also increasing pressure on businesses to make themselves more
accountable to those impacted by their activities. Many international,
regional, and national financial bodies offer dispute resolution services to
stakeholderS 22 negatively affected by projects financed through these
bodies. 23 Similarly, many companies now need to develop their own
operation-level grievance mechanisms as a condition of financing. Several
commercial banks have signed on to the Equator PrincipleS 24 and require
their clients to develop grievance mechanisms for the local communities
when the client's project involves significant environmental and social
impacts. 25 Countries are also applying pressure on multinationals to develop
these processes. Under a 2008 motion by the Australian Federal Parliament,
21. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also Christiana Ochoa, Corporate Social
Responsibility andFirm Compliance:Lessonsfrom the lnternaionalLaw-International
Relations Discourse, 9 SANTA

CLARAJ. INT'LL. 169, 175 (2011).
22. A stakeholder is "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of
the organisation's objectives." R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 46 (1984). For a list of additional definitions of stakeholder, see Paul Littau, Nirmalajyothi
Jujagiri & Gerald Adlbrecht, 25 Years of Stakeholder Theory in Project Management literature (1984-2009),

PROJECT MGMT.J. 17, 29 (2010).

23. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
24.
About
the
Equator Princrples, EQUATOR
PRINCIPLES,
http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) ("The Equator Principles
(EPs) is a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, assessing
and managing environmental and social risk in projects and is primarily intended to provide a minimum
standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision-making.").
25. Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 14, at 210; DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 27.
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the Australian government now "encourage[s] Australian companies to
respect the rights of members of the communities in which they operate and
to develop rights-compliant grievance mechanisms, whether acting in
26
Australia or overseas."
A second external driver is that businesses may experience pressure to
develop and participate in credible and effective methods of dispute
resolution in order to preclude more robust international institutional
solutions. One group of lawyers has proposed a permanent international
27
arbitration tribunal on business and human rights. This tribunal "would
likely have wide-ranging subject matter jurisdiction, covering ali human
rights for which a cause of action could arise under the laws of a state that
28
are applicable to a particular abuse."
Third, some investment funds, such as pension funds and socially
responsible investment funds, are encouraging companies to adopt
29
grievance mechanisms. As such, the use of grievance mechanisms may be
important in order for a company to remain in certain stock market indexes
30
The rise of investor
that privilege socially responsible behavior.
increases the power of
only
investing
responsible
socially
for
preferences
this driver.
Fourth, corporations may need to adopt a grievance mechanism in order
to secure certifications from organizations such as the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) and the International Organization for Standardization

(ISO).31
Another set of external drivers comes from industry and multi-industry
groups that are actively encouraging their members to develop grievance
mechanisms. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises states
that enterprises should "[p]rovide for or co-operate through legitimate
processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts where they
32
identify that they have caused or contributed to these impacts."
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) requires that member companies
33
adopt or incorporate the ETI Base Code into their own corporate codes.
The ETI Base Code is based on national and international labor standards

26. Deanna Kemp & Nora Gotzmann, Community Grievance Mechanisms and Australian Mining
Companies Offshore: An Industry Discussion Paper, CSRM 7 (2008), http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/
p
CSRM_%20minerals%20industry%20grievance%20discussion%20 aper FINAL.pdf
27. Claes Cronstedt et al., supra note 13.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 27.
Id
Id
OECD GU1DELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011).
Rees & Vermijs, supra note 4, at 42.
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and addresses labor rights issues such as forced labor, freedom of
association, and child labor.34 The ETI's Principles of Implementation
require that ETI member companies provide a confidential method for
workers at their supply factories to report the factory's violation of the
applicable corporate code.35
The trouble with external drivers is that they are often insufficient to
lead to the adoption of effective grievance mechanisms. Many of these
motivations privilege interests other than dispute resolution; the grievance
mechanism is simply a step to achieve some other desired goal, such as
financing. As a result, these drivers may contribute to the proliferation of
grievance mechanisms but these mechanisms may not be very good because
the corporations may lack a genuine interest in the mechanism's success.
That is why external drivers are not enough. The following section explores
internal drivers for why corporations do - or should - genuinely desire
an effective grievance mechanism.
B. InternalDrivers: Why CompaniesMay Want an Effective Grievance
Mechanism
The internal drivers for effective dispute resolution vary by industry.
The extractive sector is particularly active with regard to the development
of grievance mechanisms. A 2013 study by the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED) identified several mechanisms
implemented in the oil, gas, and mining industries. 36 In January 2015, the
global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues
(IPIECA) released a detailed and extensive manual providing step-by-step
guidance for companies on how to design and implement grievance
mechanisms. 37 This manual was based on seven pilot projects undertaken
over several years and is intended to implement the UN Guiding Principles
on Business & Human Rights. 38 Similarly, in 2009, the International Council
on Mining & Metals (ICMM) also released a manual for its members on
resolving local grievances. 39
This level of activity may come as a surprise given the poor human rights
records of many companies in these industries. However, these industry
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. DisPuTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 23.
37. Community GrievanceMechanisms in the Oil and Gas Industry: A ManualforImplementing OperationalLevel Grievance Mechanisms and Designing Corporate Frameworks, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/publication/community-grievance-mechanisms-oil-and-gas-industry-manual-implementing-operational-

leve (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
38. Id at 4.
39. ICMM, supra note 4.
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associations see multiple benefits for their members in effective dispute
resolution. First, according to the ICMM, an effective grievance mechanism
can "serve as a tool to build local trust and a common understanding of the
40
It is
issues and thereby strengthen stakeholder support for projects."
becoming more difficult for global companies to operate without the
41
support - to some degree - of the local population. Lack of such
support is manifested through a range of activities, from protests to lawsuits
to attacks on infrastructure. 42 Such activities impose significant costs on
corporations, both financial and reputational. An effective grievance
mechanism, using processes acceptable to local stakeholders, can offer a way
for a corporation to resolve issues in a manner that encourages local
support.
Second, by offering an effective forum for dispute resolution, a
grievance mechanism can reduce the likelihood that local actors unhappy
43
with company practices will resort to violent forms of opposition. In the
extractive sector, many acts of opposition, including violent conflict, "begin
as relatively minor issues at a local community level that could have been
resolved early and peacefully."44 A critical benefit of an effective grievance
mechanism is that "it enables companies to identify minor community
45
incidents before they escalate into unmanageable disputes."
These factors explain why extractive companies have been among the
most active regarding the adoption of grievance mechanisms. However, the
utility of grievance mechanisms is not limited to the oil, gas, and mining
sectors. There are also important reasons why companies in other industries,
such as global electronics and garments, may also want to invest in effective
superior
grievance mechanisms. For example, these mechanisms offer a
form of risk management in the value chain. Due diligence can be
challenging when the sites of production are dispersed around the globe.
40. Id. at 3.
41. See Paul Klein, Three Ways to Secure Your Socia/Iicenseto Operatein 2013, FORBES (Dec. 28,2012,
12:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/12/28/three-ways-to-secure-your-socia-licenseto-operate-in-2013.
42. See, e.g., Alan Neuhauser, Will There Be Blood?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 29, 2015, 12:01
2

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 015/07/29/mexico-faces-cartel-security-risks-inAM),
opening-energy-sector ("Mexico's plan for new profits comes with plenty of risk, as hopes for foreign
investment in the country's ailing oil and gas sector hinge largely on the government's ability to contain
powerful and often ruthless criminal organizations like Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel, or at the very
least to compel them not to attack foreign oil and gas sites . . . Experts also say the gangs extort
industrial facilities for rent or protection, and steal oil from pipelines - costing Pemex more than $1
billion in 2014 alone.. . ."); Conor Gaffey, Nigeria Shuts Two Oil Refinenes as Niger Delta Militancy Looms,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2016, 1:20 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/nigeria-shuts-two-oil-refineries8267
(explaining that Nigeria's state oil company closed down two of
niger-delta-militancy-looms-41
its oil refineries after attacks by militants).
43. ICMM, supra note 4, at 3; DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 28-29.
44. DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 29.
45. Id.
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Such fragmented production exposes companies to significant agency cost
problems. 46 It can be challenging for a corporation based in New York to
know how its suppliers are treating workers in the supply chain.
Corporations dispatch their own monitors or third party monitors to inspect
the production sites of their suppliers. 47 These monitors audit the facilities
to make sure that the suppliers are in compliance with corporate codes of
conduct. Such monitoring is meant to correct the asymmetrical information
flow between corporations and suppliers and minimize risks to the former.
Unfortunately, audits of supplier sites repeatedly fail to reveal conditions
of worker abuse. The problem is that suppliers engage in a range of practices
that compromise the information value of audits. 48 For example, they coach
workers on responses and intimidate them into providing a false image of
compliance. 49 Suppliers also hide workers, such as children, from visiting
monitors.50 The result is that a corporation spends considerable resources
to gain limited information and is still exposed to the reputational
consequences that could result from supplier behavior.
An alternative method of addressing the problem is providing workers
with a grievance mechanism. This way, a corporation learns of the
conditions at a site directly from the workers.5 ' Such information allows a
corporation to respond to the grievance before it escalates. It also provides
the corporation with an opportunity to take preventive action or improve
the operations of their value chain. 52
As Michael Vandenbergh explains, corporate social responsibility is
often a product of the "preference of individuals in importing countries for
sustainable practices in exporting countries." 53 The individual preferences
that matter are those of consumers and investors who offer strong market
incentives for environmental or labor standards in supply chains. 54 As a
result, corporate social responsibility is now part of the brand reputation for
many global companies. These companies are therefore sensitive to media
46. Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountabifiy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 749 (2014).

47. Id. at 775-76.
48. Daniella Gould, The Problem with SupplierAudits: UnderstandingHow and Why Chinese Factoies
Circumvent Codes of Conduct, 2 CORP. REsP. MGMT. 24, 25-26 (2005).
49. Ngai-Ling Sum & Pun Ngai, Globaligation and ParadoxesofEthical TransnationalProdution:Code
of Conduct in a Chinese Workplace, 9 COMPETITION & CHANGE 181, 194 (2005).

50. Charles Kernaghan, Child Labor is Back- Children Are Again Sewing Clothingfor Major U.S.
Companies, THE NAT'L LABOR COMM. (2006), http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports/200610-

IGLHR-Child-Labor-Is-Back.pdf.
51. Caroline Rees, PilotingPfinplesforEfective Company-StakeholderGieanceMechanisms:A Report of

Lessons learned, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. CORP. Soc. RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE (2011), http://www.
hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/eport 46 GMpilots.pdf [hereinafter PilotingPiniples].
52. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, CreatingShared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan--Feb.

2011, at 67-69.
53. Vandenbergh, supranote 16, at 921.

54. Id at 947; see also Koenig-Archibugi,supra note 11, at 249-50.
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reports that they engage in human rights abuses because these reports can
harm their sales and share prices. A grievance mechanism can allow a
company to address a grievance before its brand reputation is damaged from
media exposure.
Finally, grievance mechanisms are not intended to serve as substitutes
to judicial remedies. 55 However, a trusted and fair grievance mechanism may
encourage affected stakeholders to raise their claims through the grievance
process instead of through litigation.
II. PRIVATE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF
ISTRUST

In order for private institutional development to succeed, these
institutions must be accepted by those who are most affected. For example,
in the institutional development of grievance mechanisms, the United
Nations Guiding Principles recognizes the importance of "enabling trust
from the stakeholder groups for whose use [the grievance mechanisms] are
intended, and being accountable for the fair conduct of grievance
processes." 5 6 However, much of the attention to creating this trust focuses
on the attributes of the grievance mechanism at its operational stage. The
majority of the effectiveness criteria for non-judicial mechanisms under
Article 31 of the UN Guiding Principles relate to grievance mechanism
functions once it is operational.
Instead, designers of grievance mechanisms should recognize that the
extent to which an institution is trusted does not only result from its
attributes when it is operational. This trust is also a product of the processes
that led to the operational stage: standard-setting and institutional design
(see Figure 1).

nar-

g

StaddSetin

Institutional
Design

Operational
Stage

Figure 1: Three stages ofprivate institutionaldevelopment ofgrievance mechanisms.

In the context of grievance mechanisms, standard-settingrefers to the
development of codes of conduct that govern environmental, labor, and
social issues in international production. Institutional design refers to the
process of deciding issues such as the mandate of the grievance mechanism,
the remedies available, and the process(es) available for dispute resolution.

55. Guiding Princfiles on Business andHuman Rghts, supra note 6, at
56. Id. at ¶ 31 (a).

¶ 26-29 and

commentary.
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Finally, the operationalstage refers to the processes used to address a party's
grievance (see Figure 2).
Stage of Institutional Development

Example

*

Electronic Industry Citizenship
Coalition (EICC) Code of Conduct
Tesco's Oversight Stakeholder Body
(OSB)
Information facilitation

*

Negotiation

*
*
*
*

Mediation/conciliation
Investigation
Arbitration
Adjudication

STANDARD-SETTING

*

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

*

OPERATIONAL

Figure2: Examples of the three stages of institutionaldevelopment.

Building trust for a grievance mechanism should not begin once the
mechanism is operational; instead, it should begin much earlier with the
processes used for standard-setting and institutional design. Each of these
processes is important because it allows the affected parties - such as
representatives of the business enterprise, workers, and community
members - to build trust between each other and in relation to the
grievance mechanism that is created. Each of these stages is an exercise in
trust-building; the success of that trust-building will have downstream
effects on the level of trust that the resulting institution enjoys once it is
operational. It is therefore a mistake to focus only on the operational stage
of a grievance mechanism while neglecting the processes used during these
other critical stages of institutional development. The following sections
expand on these different stages of institutional development for nonjudicial grievance mechanisms. Each section also discusses illustrative
examples of mistrust that can characterize the relationship between the
parties involved in each of these three stages.
A.

Stage 1: Standard-Setting

The first stage of institutional development for a grievance mechanism
relates to the standards that it will apply. It is important to note that many
sites of international production occur in places where the rule of law is
weak. There is often a lack of local laws proscribing undesirable conduct or
ineffective access to remedies through local courts for the enforcement of
such laws. These inadequacies may partially explain why so many global
companies have relocated the production of their goods to these less
regulated spaces.
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However, alliances between the media and NGOs have revealed the
consequences of such less regulated spaces and mobilized civil society
demands for better practices by the transnational business sector. The result
was the proliferation of private codes of conduct developed by companies
- individually or collectively, with or without consultation of other
stakeholders - regarding what happens in their supply chains. Now
hundreds of global brands and retailers boast corporate codes of conduct
that are meant to establish social and environmental standards for their
suppliers. For example, HP's Supplier Social & Environmental
Responsibility Agreement states that suppliers are "responsible for
identifying any areas of its operations that do not conform to HP's Supplier
Code of Conduct and HP's General Specification for the Environment," as
well as "implementing and monitoring improvement programs designed to
achieve" these standards. 57 The agreement also gives HP the right to
progress reports and the right to records for verification of the information
58
in the supplier's reports.
This example of a company-level code of conduct also reflects broader
consensus on applicable standards. The HP Code of Conduct is based on
the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) Code of Conduct that
establishes "standards to ensure that working conditions in the electronics
industry supply chain are safe, that workers are treated with respect and
59
dignity, and that business operations are environmentally responsible."
The EICC, in turn, reflects international norms embodied in other
instruments: "[The] standards set out in the Code of Conduct reference
international norms and standards including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, ILO International Labor Standards, OECD Guidelines for
60
Multinational Enterprises, ISO and SA standards, and many more."
Despite their proliferation, these codes have not proven very effective
61
A study
and suppliers often knowingly violate their standards.
commissioned by the World Bank attempted to diagnose the primary
failings of these corporate codes. Unsurprisingly, the study found that these
codes did not garner much support from suppliers because of their

&
Environmental Responsibility Agreement,
Supplier Sodal
57.
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf
AGREEMENT].

(2008),
HP INC.
HP
[hereinafter

58. Id.
59. 1-IP Supplier Code of Conduct, HP INC. (2015), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/
environment/pdf/supcode.pdf.
60. Code ofConduct, EICC, http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-of-conduct/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2016).
61. Helle Bank Jorgenson et al., StrengtheningImplementation of Corporate Sodal Responsibility in Global

Suppy Chains, WBG 25 (2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSD/Resources/CSR/
StrengtheningImplementatio.pdf.
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marginalization and neglect in creating the applicable codes. 62 Many codes
of conduct are developed unilaterally by companies or industries. 63
This marginalization of lower-tier suppliers and workers comes at
significant costs for compliance with these codes. According to the World
Bank Study, "[s]uppliers tend to see the top-down approach as problematic
because it does not involve them sufficiently in the development and
implementation of codes." 64 Their marginalization in the process of creating
the codes means that suppliers are often unaware of the process of
improving labor and environmental practices. 65 It also reduces the
likelihood of local ownership of the codes and compromises adaptation of
a global code to the local context. 66 Neglect of suppliers also means that
there is a lost opportunity to change supplier attitudes towards codes and
alter a culture of "non-compliance" among suppliers. 67
Suppliers also tend not to trust these codes when they are drafted
without their involvement and without appreciation of their interests and
constraints in achieving implementation. For example, the World Bank
Study found that many suppliers mistrust the motivations of buyers because
of the tension between the standards promoted in corporate codes of
conduct and the substantial pressure that suppliers experience to lower
prices and decrease turnaround times. 68 This tension between the twin goals
presented by buyers leads to mistrust by suppliers regarding the motivation
and genuine commitment of buyers to their stated standards. Increased
auditing may even compound this mistrust because it sends external signals
to suppliers regarding the buyer's lack of trust in them. 69

62. Id.
63. Niklas Egels-Zanden & Peter Hyllman, Evaluating Strategiesfor Negotiating Workers' Rights in
TransnationalCorporations:The Effects ofCodes of Conduct and GlobalAgreements on Workplace Democracy, 76 J.
Bus. ETHICS 207,215 (2007) (contrasting the "unilateral nature of codes of conduct" with the "bilateral
union-TNC negotiation structure" used in global agreements); see also id at 218 ("Codes of conduct
narrowly focus on the outcome components of workplace democracy, while neglecting process
components such as shared sovereignty, participation, and access to information and education.').
64. Helle BankJorgenson et al., sipra note 61, at 23.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 23-24.
Id.
Id
Id. at 25.

69. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundationsof

CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735, 1809 (2001).
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B. Stage 2: InstitutionalDesgn
Many corporations operate in situations characterized by high mistrust
70
between themselves and the local communities. This mistrust often results
from long histories of human rights violations that went unaddressed by
7
local government actors and the corporations themselves. ' Civil conflict
only exacerbates these conditions for mistrust, especially when the conflict
concerns distributional outcomes and governance arrangements between
72
It is therefore not
the national government and local communities.
use a grievance
to
meant
are
who
stakeholders
the
that
surprising
eye.
a
skeptical
mechanism may view it with
The process of institutional design offers corporations an opportunity
to overcome this trust deficit by communicating with local actors about the
offer a
grievance mechanisms and the corporation's objectives. It can also
grievance
a
in
want
they
what
on
feedback
stakeholder
valuable setting for
mechanism. For these reasons, a variety of guidelines and best practices
recommend engaging local stakeholders during the institutional design
stage. 73 For example, Principle 31(h) of the UN Guiding Principles advises
that operational-level grievance mechanisms should be based on
"engagement and dialogue" that involves "consulting the stakeholder
74
groups for whose use they are intended on their design and performance."
Commentary to Principle 31 explains that "[fjor an operational-level
grievance mechanism, engaging with affected stakeholder groups about its
design and performance can help to ensure that it meets their needs, that

70. See, e.g., Hendrik Kotze, FarmworkerGrievances in the Western Cape, South Africa, ACCESS CASE
STORY SERIES (2014), http://accessfacility.org/sites/default/files/Farmworker%/`20Grievances/`20
Western%20Cape%20South%20Africa.pdf.
71. See Joe Brock, Shell Fuelled Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria-NGO, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2011,
2
1:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 011/10/03/nigeria-shell-idUSL5E7L33Q720111003.
72. See The Price of Oik Corporate Responsibiity and Human RIghts Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing
Communities, HUMAN RTS. WATCH 84 (1999), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/
nigeria0l99.pdf.
73. See Sarah Knuckey & Eleanor Jenkin, Company-Created Remedy Mechanisms for Serious Human
RightsAbuses:A Promising New .Frontierforthe Right to Remedy?, 19 INT'LJ. HUM. RTS. 801, 806 (2015).
74. Guiding Princiles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 6, at ¶ 31(h). Similarly, the Office of
the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation recommends
stakeholder engagement during the developmental and operational phases of the grievance mechanism.
A Guide to Designing and Implementing Grievance Mechanisms for Development Projects, OFFICE OF THE
http://www.caoombudsman.org/
(2008),
2
ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN
COMPLIANCE
howwework/advisor/documents/implemgrieveng.pdf. These recommendations are supported by
"best practice" studies of grievance mechanisms already in place. Assessing the Effectiveness of Company
Results, CSR EUR.
Grievance Mechanisms: CSR Europe's Management of Complaints Assessment (MOC-A)
2
(2013), http://www.csreurope.org/sites/default/files/Report%/20Summary-%/ OManagement%/`20of
2
%20Complaints%20assessment-%20final%2Dec%20 013.pdf; Piloting Principles, supra note 51.
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they will use it in practice, and that there is a shared interest in ensuring its
success." 75

Although stakeholder engagement is important for institutional design,
it is not enough to ensure trust-building and the creation of an effective
grievance mechanism. The following case provides an illustration of the
challenges of stakeholder engagement. The retail supermarket Tesco sources
fruit from over 600 farms across the Western Cape of South Africa. 76 Tesco
expects all its suppliers to abide by the standards of the ETI Base Code.77 It
recently piloted a grievance mechanism for farm-level disputes in the
Western Cape Region of South Africa in order to enforce the standards of
the ETI Base Code and as part of a broader study on effective principles for
grievance mechanisms.

78

When Tesco started the process of designing a grievance mechanism,
its representatives knew that they were confronting a significant trust deficit.
There was a high level of mistrust between key stakeholders in the fruit value
chain in the region because of a number of structural issues in the fruit
sector, including discriminatory hiring and employment practices and health
and safety conditions on the farms.7 9 Tesco attempted to build trust and
create "buy-in" for its grievance mechanism by establishing an Oversight
Stakeholder Body (OSB) composed of members of several stakeholder
groups: business, government, trade unions, and other civil society
organizations.o Their mandate was to design a grievance mechanism for the
resolution of farm-level disputes.81
The institutional design process began with bold ambitions as Tesco
wanted the local stakeholder community to have significant ownership over
the design and development of the local grievance mechanisms. 82 Tesco's
objectives were apt because, as it learned from the pilot project, "for these
types of initiatives to be successful and sustainable in the long-term, local
75. Guiding Principleson Business andHuman Rights, supra note 6, at 27.
76. Kotze, supra note 70, at 3.
77. OurEthical TradingApproach: Supporting Decent LabourStandardsin Tesco's Supply Chain, TESCo 2
(2015), http://www.tescopic.com/assets/fles/cms/Resources/TradingResponsibly/OurEthical
Trading-approachAug 2015.pdf [hereinafter TESCO].
78. Kotze, supra note 70, at 3 (describing how Tesco undertook this project in cooperation with
the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (CSRI) of Harvard University's Kennedy School and both
Tesco and CSRI did this project on behalf of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human

Rights, John Ruggie).
79. Id at 5; see also HUMAN RTS. WATCH, RIPE WITH ABUSE: HuMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN
SOUTH AFRICA'S FRUIT AND WINE INDUSTRIES 11 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/
08 23
/ /ripe-abuse/human-rights-conditions-south-africas-fruit-and-wine-industries.
80. Kotze, supra note 70, at 5.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 7; From Audit to Innovation: Advancing Human Rghts in Global Suppy Chains, SHIFr (2013),

http://shiftprojectorg/sites/default/files/From%20Audit%20to%20Irnovation-

Advancingo/o20Human/2ORights%20in%20Global/2Supply%2OChainsO.pdf
Audit to Innovation].

[hereinafter
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stakeholders need to feel that they own and drive the process, and not that
83
they are being driven by multinational brands and retailers." Tesco made
good on this desire for local ownership and even chose to become a nonvoting member of the OSB. 84 It also engaged a neutral third-party mediator,
85
Bill Thompson, to facilitate the process.
Despite these good efforts, Tesco was not sufficiently prepared for
stakeholder conflict during the institutional design process. One significant
conflict that emerged concerned the mandate of the grievance mechanism.
Tesco preferred a narrow mandate that was limited to a discrete farm-based,
labor-focused complaints-handling mechanism. 86 Other OSB members,
however, wanted a broader mandate that allowed for sectoral reform and
87
was not only limited to farm-level grievances. Tesco, under time pressure
to develop the grievance mechanism, addressed this conflict by drafting the
Terms of Reference for the OSB, which limited the mandate to an
operational-level grievance mechanism. Although Tesco submitted the
88
Terms of Reference to the broader OSB group for debate and adoption,
its limitation of the mandate "had a decisive impact on the value of the
process." 89 Those whose views did not prevail on the issue of the mandate
90
"lost interest and ceased effective participation."
The fact that a conflict arises is not necessarily enough to destroy trust
within institutional design; after all, only some members of the OSB rejected
the narrower mandate supported by Tesco. However, in order to preserve
trust, this conflict must be resolved in a manner that accords with
participants' sense of fairness. Unfortunately, it does not appear that was
what happened here: "Some of the participants may have felt that the OSB
was only established to try and give credentials to a process that had already
been decided on. This feeling came about because some OSB members felt
that their views were not fully listened to, and that the outcomes were much
narrower that what they felt was required." 91 According to Thompson,
adherence to an external mandate and deadlines resulted in sporadic and
92
limited attendance at OSB.

The subsequent farmworker protests in 2012 and 2013 reinforced a
view among "South African stakeholders that the grievance mechanism

83. From Audit to Innovation, supra note 82, at 45.
84. Kotze, supra note 70, at 7.

85. Id.
86. Id at 6.
87. Id.
88. Piloting Principles, supra note 51, at 68.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Kotze, supra note 70, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
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produced by the Tesco pilot did not serve as a viable channel for
farmworkers to air the simmering grievances underlying these protest
actions." 93 Instead, the grievance mechanism was branded as a "Tesco
pilot."

94

Another contributing factor to this failure was insufficient trustbuilding: "There were severe trust issues around the project. People doubted
what Tesco's real agenda might be, which was probably part of general
distrust of big multi-nationals. Past history between stakeholders also played
a role." 95
In a follow-up study on the project, South African stakeholders
explained that "by not prioritizing time and space for trust-building and buyin to a common agenda, the process had little prospect of effecting real
change in the conflict dynamics or human rights of farmworkers." 96
C Stage 3: OperationalStage
In 2014, the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations
(SOMO) reported their findings on a multinational study of factory-level
97
grievance mechanisms used in the global electronics industry. SOMO
interviewed or surveyed 337 workers from 40 companies in the electronics
industries of China, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand.98 SOMO's
intent was to evaluate these company-level grievance mechanisms according
to the effectiveness criteria of Article 31 of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights.9 9 As part of this study, SOMO and its partners
asked factory workers if they trusted the systems in place and if they were
satisfied with the operation and outcomes of these grievance mechanisms. 00
The individuals interviewed worked at factories operated by some of the
world's leading contract manufacturers, including Foxconn, Flextronics,
Nokia, and Toshiba.101
The findings were grim. According to SOMO's study, 64% of the
workers did not trust their grievance mechanisms.1 02 Trust was particularly
low in Mexico (88% mistrust), followed next by India (64% mistrust), and
93. Id. at 9.
94. From Audit to Innovation, supra note 82, at 44.
95. Kotze, supra note 70, at 6.

96. Id at 4.
97. Colleen Freeman & Esther de Haan, Using Grievance Mechanisms: Accessibilit, Predictabilit,
Legitimay and Workers' Complaint Experiences in the Electronics Sector, SOMO (2014), available at
http://www.somo.nl/publications-en/Publication4059.

98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. at 30.
102. Id. at 35.
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103
China and Thailand tying at 57% mistrust. Within these countries, worker
trust varied by company. In India, Flextronics enjoyed a particularly high
04
level of trust among workers compared with Nokia and Foxconn.1 In
Thailand, LTEC Fujikura garnered greater worker trust than Sony and
Fisher-Paykel. 05 In Mexico, however, the level of mistrust was uniformly
06
high among all three factories surveyed: Flextronics, Foxconn, and Jabil.
The reported mistrust was so high among participants that SOMO
concluded that "a very large majority of respondents continue to not trust
107
their GMs."

The reasons for this mistrust vary, but the primary reasons are:
(a) complaints go unresolved, (b) workers fear termination or punishment,
(c) the process is not impartial, fair and/or genuine, and (d) not all outcomes
are reported. 108 Overall, SOMO concluded that "the companies are basically
failing to implement their GM processes in a manner that engenders
workers' trust."10 9
III.

UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS OF MISTRUST: PRIMARY V.
SECONDARY CONFLICTS

When engaging in institutional development, a corporation should
distinguish between primat and seconday conflicts. This distinction
intentionally evokes H.L.A. Hart's typology of rules. Hart distinguished
10
between primary rules and secondary rules in a legal system.1 Primary rules
are rules of conduct concerning what an individual should or should not do;
they confer duties on individuals.111 Examples of primary rules include
2
criminal statutes that identify proscribed behavior.1 By contrast, secondary
rules concern the creation, extinction, and alteration of primary rules; they
3
confer legal powers to modify primary rules.11 Examples of secondary rules
are those that confer "legal powers to adjudicate or legislate (public powers)
or to create or vary legal relations (private powers)."114
103. Id
104. Id. at 30.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 37; see also Summary of Discussions of the Forum on Business and Human Rzghts, Preparedby the

Chaiperson, Makarim Wibisono,

¶ 46, U.N.

Doc. A/HRC/FBHR/2013/4 (April 15, 2014); UN Forum

on Business and Human Rights, Access to Effective Non-judicialRemedy -

UN Forum on Business andHuman

Rights, YouTube (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zT-ijA4JTk&ist=PL
YUVFvBU-loceMjo57pWMfFpNcfvWsws_&index=5.
108. Freeman & de Haan, supra note 97, at 35-36.
109. Id at 37.
110. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79-81 (2d ed. 1994).
111. Id at 81.
112. Id at 79.
113. Id at 81.
114. Id at 79.

606

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 56:3

Hart's typology parallels the types of conflicts that corporations
encounter in their engagement with stakeholders: primay conflicts and
secondaU conflicts. Primary conflicts concern a violation of the rules governing
behavior of a corporation or its suppliers, such as the corporate code of
conduct. The code of conduct identifies the responsibilities of a supplier
towards its workers. When the code's rules are violated, a complainant, the
worker, will claim that the supplier breached the applicable rule and,
consequently, will request a remedy from the grievance mechanism. Primary
conflicts are easy to identify; international arbitration tribunals, mediation
sessions, and grievance committees are all examples of dispute resolution of
primary conflicts (see Figure 3(a)).
Site of

Type of

Conflict

Conflict

Example

Nature of Conflict
*
*

OPERATIONAL

Primary

Conflict regarding
the breach of the
applicable standard
and a request for
remedies

*
*
*
*
*

Information
facilitation
Negotiation
Mediation/
conciliation
Investigation
Arbitration
Adjudication

Figure3(a): Primay vs. Seconday Conflicts in InstitutionalDevelopment

For example, Tesco, as a founding member of the Ethical Trading
Initiative (ETI), expects all of its suppliers to abide by the standards of the
ETI Base Code," 5 a multi-industry code of labor practice that is based on
the conventions of the International Labour Organization.1 6 The core
provisions of the ETI Base Code are as follows: (a) employment is freely
chosen, (b) freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are
respected, (c) working conditions are safe and hygienic, (d) child labor shall
not be used, (d) living wages are paid, (e) working hours are not excessive,
(f) no discrimination is practiced, (g) regular employment is provided, and
(h) no harsh or inhumane treatment is allowed." 7 Providing standards is
only half a solution to improving supply chains; workers must have a means
to enforce those standards and seek remedies when those standards are
breached. That is why Tesco embarked on the process of designing a
grievance mechanism for its supply chain in South Africa. This project was
an attempt to address primary conflicts that arise when Tesco's suppliers in
South Africa violate the ETI Base Code.
115. TESCo, supra note 77, at 2.
116. ETIBase Code, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code
(last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
117. Id.
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Unfortunately, primary conflicts are not the only types of conflicts that
arise in global value chains; secondary conflicts also arise, but they are less
obvious. Secondary conflicts concern the normative and procedural bases
for primary conflicts. They are disputes about the creation or amendment
of (a) the applicable standards (such as corporate codes of conduct) that
apply between the parties, or (b) the method for resolving breaches of those
standards (such as mediation, arbitration, or other grievance mechanisms).
Given the nature of these conflicts, they are likely to arise during the
standard-setting stage or the institutional design stage. Secondary conflicts
arise during standard-setting when workers, local managers, representatives
of transnational corporations (TNCs), and other stakeholders disagree over
the content of the standards that the parties should uphold. Examples of
such standards are the corporate codes of conduct that transnational
companies introduce into their value chain and demand that suppliers
implement. These standards are the bases for the claims and remedies that
aggrieved workers will seek through a grievance mechanism.
Site of
Conflict

Type of
Conflict

Nature of Conflict

Example
*

*
D
SETTING
ST N

Conflict over the
content of the
applicable standard

Secondary

*
*
OPERATIONAL

Primary

Conflict regarding
the breach of the
applicable standard
and a request for
remedies

*

*
*
*
*

Electronic
Industry
Citizenship
Coalition (EICC)
Code of Conduct
Information
facilitation
Negotiation
Mediation/
conciliation
Investigation
Arbitration
Adjudication

Figure 3(b): Primary vs. Secondary Conflicts in InstitutionalDevelopment

Secondary conflicts can also arise during institutional design. These
conflicts occur when workers, managers, TNCs, and others stakeholders
disagree over the form and functions of the grievance mechanism that is
used to settle secondary conflicts. Disagreements can occur over whether
the grievance mechanism will (a) issue binding or non-binding decisions;
(b) use external parties and, if so, in what capacity; (c) favor arbitration,
mediation, or some other form of conflict resolution; or (d) publish their
decisions in the interest of transparency, and other institutional choices.
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SETTING

INSTITUTIONAL
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*

Conflict over the
content of the
applicable standard

*

Conflict over the
form and function

Secondary

*

OPERATIONAL

Primary

Conflict regarding
the breach of the
applicable standard
and a request for
remedies

Tesco's
Oversight
Stakeholder
Body (OSB)

*
*

Electronic
Industry
Citizenship
Coalition (EICC)
Code of Conduct

of the grievance
mechanism for
resolution of
breaches of the
applicable standards

Secondary

[Vol. 56:3

a
*

Information
facilitation
Negotiation
Mediation/
conciliation
Investigation

*
*

Arbitration

*

Adjudication

Figure 3(c): Primay vs. SecondaU Conflicts in InstitutionalDevelopment

-

One illustration of such a secondary conflict comes from Tesco's pilot
of a grievance mechanism for its fruit farms in South Africa that was
discussed in Section II(B). The different stakeholders involved in Tesco's
Oversight Stakeholder Body disagreed over the mandate for the grievance
mechanism.11 8 Some members wanted a narrow mandate while others
preferred an approach capable of addressing the broader, structural issues
within the industry." 9 Both of these views dealt with the scope of issues that
would be addressed by the grievance mechanism that they were designing.
The resolution of this conflict in favor of a narrow mandate resulted in a
loss of participation and interest by those who lost this battle.1 20 What Tesco
lacked was a strategy to address this type of conflict. It was so focused on
designing a mechanism to deal with breaches of the ETI Base Code
primary conflicts - that it neglected to deal with secondary conflicts while
designing the grievance mechanism.
Standard-setting and institutional design both represent sites of
potential conflict that also need effective resolution. However, there is
disproportionate and almost exclusive attention to the resolution of primary

118. Kotze, supra note 70, at 6; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.

120. Id.
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conflicts. Conflict management works better when parties distinguish
between these two types of conflicts because parties are more likely to utilize
processes that are more appropriate for each type of conflict. In particular,
they are more likely to recognize secondary conflict as a particular class of
conflicts that requires strategies for management. Failure to acknowledge
secondary conflicts means that companies are unprepared for conflict
management in their engagement with stakeholders. The result is a deadlock
where no decisions are reached and stakeholder engagement is abandoned
with public relations consequences. Alternatively, the deadlock is overcome
by unilateral decision-making by the company under the thin guise of multistakeholder consensus. This latter move will not fool the public or media
for long. Unilateral corporate action will be recognized as such and the
outcomes that follow will be mistrusted. This is why it is critical that
companies are prepared when they go to the stakeholder table.
III.

A NEED FOR NEW PROCEDURAL CRITERIA?

This section explores whether any existing approaches to global
governance institutions address the trust-building challenges confronted by
the transnational business sector. In response to a range of transboundary
harms, an increasing amount of global regulation occurs outside the
traditional format of command and control regulation exercised by state
actors.121 Transnational networks of regulators, international organizations
established by treaties, and global standard-setting bodies are all part of this
22
trend towards an "unruled world."1
This phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by the academy. The Global
Administrative Law (GAL) Project examines transparency and
"formal
by
regulation
with
associated
issues
accountability
intergovernmental regulatory bodies, informal intergovernmental regulatory
networks and coordination arrangements, national regulatory bodies
operating with reference to an international intergovernmental regime,
hybrid public-private regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies
exercising transnational governance functions of particular public
significance."l 23
GAL scholars are primarily concerned with the good governance of
global administrative bodies and they are not alone in this regard. A number
121. See Stewart Patrick, The Unruled World: The Casefor GoodEnough Global Governance, 93 FOREIGN
AFF. 58 (2014) (defining global governance as "the collective effort by sovereign states, international
organizations, and other non-state actors to address common challenges and seize opportunities that
transcend national frontiers").

122. Id. at 58.
123. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 17; see also Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at

the SupranationalScak: GlobalizingAdministrativeLaw, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1500 (2006).
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of scholars have generally recommended the following prescriptions:
(a) transparency and access to information,1 24 (b) broad participation,1 25
(c) reasoned decisions1 26 and effective review of rules and decisions,1 27 and
(d) accountability. This Article does not challenge the importance or validity
of these criteria for global governance. This section only evaluates the
applicability of these procedural recommendations to the resolution of
secondary conflicts discussed in the case study of Tesco above.
A. Transparency
Transparency is important because it serves as a foundation for other
procedural values, such as public participation and the right of review, as
well as fostering accountability by "exposing administrative decisions and
relevant documents to public and peer scrutiny."1 28 Transparency "helps
ensure that there is some sort of dialogue between the government and the
governed to act as a disciplining check on power and guard against the
possibility of capture by interest groups."1 29
The UN Guiding Principles similarly prioritize transparency for nonjudicial grievance mechanisms.1 30 Providing information through statistics
and case studies can help establish legitimacy and trust among a broad
stakeholder base.131 However, the benefits of transparency must also be
weighed against party interests in confidentiality that are vital in order for
complainants to come forward without fear of retaliation.1 32 It is important
to remember that these potential complainants may be in employment
relationships where they are vulnerable and their anonymity is important.1 33
This expectation of confidentiality is consistent with the broader practice of
transnational dispute resolution that respects the parties' expectations of
privacy.

124. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 38; Esty, supra note 123, at 1530-31,

1533.
125. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 34-35, 37-38; Esty, supra note 123,

at 1531-32.

126. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 39; Esty, supra note 123, at 1529-30.
127. See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 39-40; Esty, supra note 123, at 1536.
128. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 38; Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 11, at 238;
Jost Delbriick, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Demoau and/or Alternative
Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 42 (2003).

129. Laura A. Dickinson, PrivatitationandAcountabit~y, 7 ANN. REv. L. Soc. SCi. 101, 110 (2011).
130. GuidingPrinapleson Business and Human Rights, supra note 6, at 27.

131. Id.
132. Id; Caroline Rees, Corporations and Human Rights: Accountability Mechanisms for Resoling
Complaints and Disputes, HARV. U. 12 (2007), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/
publications/report_ 15accountabilitymechanisms.pdf.
133. Rees, supra note 132, at 12.
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It is also worth asking whether improved transparency could have
improved Tesco's stakeholder discussions. Tesco included a range of
stakeholders in its discussions, which is one way of increasing
transparency. 134 Tesco also engaged in a variety of outreach efforts with fruit
producers and workers in order to obtain participation in the pilot project
35
and obtain feedback on the draft grievance mechanism.1 Despite these
efforts, stakeholder engagement was a challenging process for Tesco.
Tesco's experience suggests that successful multi-stakeholder engagement is
dependent upon a type of transparency that is often ignored: transparency
regarding character attributes and dispositions. The Tesco story is ultimately
a story of failed trust among the various stakeholders involved.
Transparency can be an important ingredient for overcoming this lack of
trust, but it would involve more than sharing information regarding
decision-making processes and documents. As discussed below in Section
IV(B), it necessitates transparency regarding the character of the participants
themselves.
B. Broad Partiibation
For administrative lawyers, public participation ensures dialogue
36
"between the government and the governed"1 so that "affected individuals
... have their views and relevant information considered before a decision
is taken."1 37 This emphasis on public participation accords with the UN
Guiding Principles by advocating the importance of broad participation by
external stakeholders. Unfortunately, as illustrated in the Tesco case study,
participation is not enough to ensure that external stakeholders have a voice
in the process. After all, Tesco's Oversight Stakeholder Body included
members from several stakeholder groups, including business, trade unions,
38
civil society, and government.1
What the Tesco case study illustrates is that it is equally important to
develop a method for dealing with stakeholder conflicts when participants'
views clash, such as the stakeholder disagreement over the mandate for the
actors
grievance mechanism. A corporation that consults with a range of
more
any
trusted
be
not
may
decision-making
unilateral
and then engages in
ensure
to
order
In
anyone.
than a company that opted not to consult with

134. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 37-38.
135. Piloting Princifles, supra note 51, at 65, 69-70.
136. Laura A. Dickinson, Regulaling the Privatited Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private

Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 417, 432 (2013-2014).
137. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 16, at 37.
138. PilotingPrincples, supra note 51, at 68.
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that participation is meaningful, corporations must also adopt a method of
stakeholder conflict management that is perceived as fair and trustworthy.

C Rght of Review
Requiring reasoned decisions for administrative decision-making makes
sense when we are dealing with adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative actions or
administrative bodies engaging in supranational policymaking.1 39
However, under Article 31 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, operation-level grievance mechanisms should be based
on engagement and dialogue, with the latter as the preferred means of
addressing and resolving grievances.1 40 This focus on dialogue results from
a business enterprise's position as both the subject of complaint and the
architect of the dispute resolution system.141 As a result, operational-level
grievance mechanisms usually abandon adjudicative approaches in favor of
negotiation, mediation, and conciliation.
A dialogue-based approach is less likely to lead to decisions that can be
reviewed by local courts, especially during the institutional design stage.
Even if a decision was produced that could be reviewed, to whom would
the claimants appeal? If the local courts were effective for adjudication of
their claims, then one would expect the claimants to resort to these courts
instead of opting for a grievance mechanism run by the corporation that
caused the harm. Unfortunately, operation-level grievance mechanisms
often substitute for a local legal order that is absent.1 42

D. Accountability/Sancions
Accountability depends on ensuring that transnational actors conform
to the preferences and expectations of key stakeholders.1 43 In the public
context, this sanction takes the form of removal from office through
elections when elected officials fail to conform to public expectations.'" In
the market context, consumers and NGOs sanction importing firms
through boycotts and media campaigns or by resort to accountability
mechanisms.1 45

139. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, spranote 16, at 39; Esty, sapra note 123, at 1529-30.
140. Guiding Princples on Business and Human Rights, supra note 6, at 27.

141. Id.
142. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of legal remedies in Papua
New Guinea by women assaulted by contractors of Barrick Gold).
143. See Vandenbergh, supra note 16, at 959-60; Macdonald & Macdonald, supra note 16, at 112;
Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 11, at 238; Dickinson, supranote 136, at 435.
144. Macdonald & Macdonald, supra note 16, at 112.
145. Vandenbergh, supra note 16, at 961; Macdonald & Macdonald, supra note 16, at 116-17.
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The intended users of grievance mechanisms have few, if any, sanctions
to wield over transnational business enterprises. The most significant
sanction is one that threatens the continued business operation of a
corporation in a locality, but such a sanction can be very costly for the
stakeholders who try to employ it. Northern intermediaries (e.g.,
transnational advocacy networks, media) can help to buttress local
stakeholder power through public exposure and consumer activism, but
only to a point. After all, many of the corporations adopting grievance
mechanisms operate in the energy sector where naming and shaming
practices do not have the same resonance. The most effective sanctions are
those offered by some form of accountability mechanism. Unfortunately,
recognizing the need for an accountability mechanism does not explain how
to ensure that it is trusted and trustworthy.
IV. THE STEWARDSHIP OF TRUST FRAMEWORK: RESOLVING
SECONDARY CONFLICTS

As discussed in Section I, trust is vital for institutional design to
succeed. The dominant approaches to governance of global institutions,
valid and valuable in other contexts, appear less well suited to the challenges
confronted by Tesco and other businesses that undertake institutional
design.
This section suggests an alternative framework for institutional
development that addresses the challenges experienced by Tesco: the
stewardship of trust (SoT). Under the SoT framework, each stage of
institutional development is a site for trust-building between the
multinational enterprise and its local suppliers, workers, and community
members. At its core, it involves stakeholder engagement during each of its
stages, transforming potentially top-down corporate policies into
collaborative governance. As demonstrated in Section III, stakeholder
engagement is not sufficient on its own to build trust or ensure success of
the institutions developed.
Under SoT, corporations should distinguish between conflicts about
non-compliance with applicable standards (primay conflicts) from conflicts
about the content of those standards and their enforcement (secondaU
conflicts). Corporations should focus on resolving both primary and secondary
conflicts for three important reasons. First, stakeholder acceptance of
processes and outcomes used to resolve primary conflicts - the grievance
mechanism in its operational stage - will depend upon the processes used
to overcome secondary conflicts during the stages of standard-setting and
institutional design. Unsatisfactory resolution of these conflicts can lead to
lack of participation by stakeholders, which can subsequently compromise
the acceptance of the grievance mechanism during its operational stage.
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Second, the processes used for resolving primary and secondary
conflicts can be vital opportunities to facilitate the growth of trust between
parties. As explained above in Section II, mistrust is often high between
stakeholders when they embark on institutional design. The process of
institutional design, especially concerning how secondary conflicts are
resolved, can provide important opportunities for trust-building that can
endow the operational grievance mechanism with acceptance by the local
community. A stewardship of trust framework must incorporate specific
tools intended to facilitate the growth of trust during the three institutional
stages.
Third, some critics may respond that secondary conflicts only arise
when there is increased stakeholder participation; reduce such participation
and potentially reduce the likelihood and severity of such secondary
conflicts. The response is that secondary conflicts are not going away and
are only likely to increase as the United Nations, industry organizations, and
other actors push for stakeholder engagement in institutional development.
As stakeholder engagement expands, so do the voices at the table and the
risks for secondary conflict.

A. Strategiesfor Secondary Conflict Resolution
Stakeholder engagement is a good place to begin the process of
institutional design, but it is not enough for this process to succeed. This is
because stakeholder engagement is not synonymous with stakeholder
harmony. Stakeholders come to the negotiating table with particular
interests and fears. Often, they share long histories of conflict between each
other and with the company that is undertaking the institutional
development. It is no surprise, therefore, that such situations are
characterized by high levels of mistrust among those at the table. It is also
not a surprise that those at the table may disagree about important decisions
regarding institutional design. For example, during the institutional design
phase for Tesco's grievance mechanism, stakeholders disagreed over the
scope of the mandate for the grievance mechanism.1 46 Those participating
in the institutional design process had not developed a method for resolving
such stakeholder conflicts. The result was that that those who lost this
disagreement also lost interest in the institutional design process.1 47
Stakeholder conflicts during the institutional design stage may be
inevitable but they are not necessarily fatal to the process. Disagreements
may occur but what is vital is that there is a strategy in place to address these
disagreements and that this strategy is perceived as acceptable by those

146. Kotze, supra note 70, at 6; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
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stakeholders participating in the institutional design process. The following
examples illustrate strategies for secondary conflict resolution.
1. Wilmar Group in Indonesia

'

The Wilmar Group (Wilmar) is a leading global trader in palm oil.
Wilmar acquired palm oil plantations on the island of Kalimantan in 1980.
Wilmar received financial support for its operations through loans and
48
guarantees from the International Finance Corporation (IFC).1 The IFC is
one of the organizations of the World Bank Group and supports the private
sector in developing countries. Companies that receive financial support
from the IFC are obligated to comply with the IFC's Performance Standards
49
on Environmental and Social Sustainability.1
In addition to providing standards for conduct, the IFC also provides
been negatively affected
grievance mechanisms for stakeholders who have
50
by conduct of companies financed by the IFC.1 The Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman (CAO) addresses complaints from persons claiming social and
environmental impact of IFC/MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee
5
Agency) projects.'
In 2007, a group of civil society and community organizations filed a
complaint with the CAO alleging that Wilmar's wholly-owned subsidiaries
(Wilmar Subsidiaries) in Indonesia violated a number of the IFC's
52
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability.1
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Wilmar Subsidiaries failed to
comply with local laws requiring environmental impact assessment and
permits, failed to conduct social and environmental assessments, engaged in
involuntary land acquisition and re-settlement, inadequately protected
habitats, and provided insufficient measures to protect indigenous
populations.1 53
Even though the parties were ultimately resolving issues regarding land
rights and other primary conflicts, they were also prepared for secondary
COMPLIANCE
OF THE
148. Indonesia/ Wimar Group-01/WIest Kalimantan, OFFICE
(July 1, 2014), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case-detail.
ADvISOR/OMBUDSMAN
aspx?id=76.
149. Performance Standards on Enironmental and Social Sustainability, INT'L FIN. CORP. (2012),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1 15482804a0255db96fbffdla5dl3d27/PS-English 2012_F
ull-Document.pdPMOD=AJPERES.
150. Terms of Reference 2, OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN,
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/whoweare/documents/TOR CAO.pdf.
151. Id. The complaints to CAO often relate to "Indigenous Peoples, land acquisition and
involuntary resettlement, environmental management, and labour and working conditions." About the
http://www.caoCAO: Our Roles, OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN,
ombudsman.org/a bout/ourroles/.
152. Terms of Reference, supra note 150, at 5-7.
153. Id.
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conflicts during the negotiation process. They invested in developing a prenegotiation framework outlining how they planned to address and resolve
secondary conflicts that may emerge during the negotiation process. This
framework was encapsulated in a Memorandum of Understanding (MO"I)
that established the parameters of the negotiation process.1 54
As an agreement, the "MOU established the roles and responsibilities
of each party, the expectations for decision making ... and what to do in
the event of a disagreement or deadlock." 55 The MOU provided rules for
communication, disclosure, monitoring, and information dissemination.1 56
It also affirmed the role of the mediation process as the exclusive avenue
for resolution of disputes between Wilmar and the local communities. This
recognition of exclusivity was important because it "encouraged both parties
to overcome deadlocks within the process rather than going outside of it
when the discussions were difficult or broke down temporarily."1 57 The
MOU provided the parties with a framework for negotiations, including
how disputes would be resolved. This shows that the parties implicitly
understood the distinction between primary and secondary stakeholder
conflicts and anticipated the latter during the negotiation process.
A plan for secondary conflict resolution is important not only for
reaching an agreement but also for legitimizing the agreement reached. The
MOU's process for handling conflicts during negotiations provided
credibility and legitimacy for the outcomes reached. Given their history and
interests, it was highly likely that the local residents and Wilmar would
disagree on the outcomes of their disputes. Neither party's interests would
likely prevail at every stage of the negotiation process. However, because
the process for reaching the MOU, as well as the MOU agreement,
legitimized the process of negotiations that followed and the parties were
given a real opportunity to reach an agreement, the negotiation process was
ultimately successful and resulted in two final agreements.' 58 Wilmar agreed
to return 1,699 hectares of community land and to compensate households
for appropriated land or for losses associated with Wilmar's land clearance
practices.1 59
154. Id.
155. Indonesia: Wilmar Gro;p-01/WestKalimantan FinalReport -CAO
Dispute Resointion Function,
OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN
3-4 (2014), http://www.caoombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/ClosureReport-Wilmarl -June2014English.pdf
[hereinafter Close Out Report].

156. Id
157. Id
158. Close Out Report, sepra note 155, at 1; see also Memorandum ofAgreement Co-Management ofLand
UtilitationBetween Sajingan Kecil Hamlet Community and Agronusa Investama Co. (2008), http://www.caoombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/08_11_24AgreementSajingan-ANIver-

ENG.pdf.
159. Close Out Report, supranote 155, at 1.
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2. Chevron in the Niger Delta
The Niger Delta supplies forty percent of US imports of crude oil and,
over several decades of oil production, has generated $700 billion in oil
revenue.

160

Chevron has been operating in Nigeria for over fifty years. Much of that
history has been widely criticized, with Chevron faulted for economically
marginalizing local populations, contaminating the environment,
suppressing peaceful protests, and funding violent action by state military
forces.1 61
As local resistance -

sometimes violent -

grew to Chevron's

continued oil operations, Chevron responded by undertaking community
projects such as building local hospitals and schools, bolstering local
economic development with increased hiring and sub-contracting, and
162
It also reached a series of
providing scholarships for local communities.
agreements with local communities with terms providing for development
63
of small projects and homage payments to local leaders.1
These agreements did not work for several reasons. The agreements
were often signed "in the heat of a crisis that impeded . . operations" of oil
companies, fostering the view that "oil companies were giving contracts to
64
As such, they lacked credibility - with
local leaders to buy their silence."
local stakeholders and civil society. They were also not implemented or were
implemented badly. 6 5 When a group of Ugborodo community members
demonstrated to protest the non-implementation of the agreements, they
were met with "maximum violence by a combined force of armed police
66
and soldiers," resulting in one death and dozens of injuries.1
In 2005, Chevron adopted a new approach to community-corporate
relations. It signed several three-year General Memoranda of Understanding
(GMOUs) with communities affected by Chevron's activities. These
GMOUs established multi-stakeholder governance structures for the
identification, development, and oversight of local community projects that
160. See Nnimmo Bassey, Emem Okon, Laura Livoti & Abby Rubinson, Chevron in Nigea, in THE
(2010),
45
REPORT
ANNUAL
AN
ALTERNATIVE
OF
CHEVRON:
COST
TRUE
http://justiceinnigerianow.org/lppy/2010-alternative-annual-report.pdf.
161. See id. at 45-46.
162. Merrick Hoben, David Kovick, David Plumb & Justin Wright, Corporate and Community
Engagement in the Niger Delta: Lessons Learnedfrom Chevron Ngeia Limited's GMOU Process, CONSENSUS
20
http://www.cbuilding.org/sites/default/files/Corporate%20and%
INST. 4 (2012),
BLDG.
Community%20Engagement%20in%20the%20Niger%20DeltaLessons%2OLearned.pdf.
163. Id at 3.
164. Stephen A. Faleti, Challengesof Chesron's GMOU Impkmentation in Jtsekiri Communities of Western
Niger Delta, http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/StephenFALETIChallenges of Chevron
GMOUImplementation in ltsekiriCommunites of WesternNiger_Delta.pdf.
165. Id at 12.
166. Id at 19.
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Chevron funded.1 67 The GMOU model was a step in the right direction for
winning local trust, but it was not enough.
The first round of GMOUs expired in 2008. Chevron wanted to learn
about the strengths and weaknesses of the GMOU model before renegotiating the next set of GMOUs.168 In order to gain this understanding,
Chevron engaged in a novel diagnostic. It approached local stakeholders to
collaborate on the design of a process to evaluate the GMOU framework.' 69
Chevron worked with the area communities, local NGOs, and the
government to identify the goals of the evaluation and develop a data
collection strategy and interview protocol.1 70 Once the design process was
complete,

'

a team of trained data collectors drawn from local NGOs used the
strategy and protocol to conduct interviews and focus groups in the
eight RDC areas, involving more than 1,000 individuals. The data
collection team covered all five states where the GMOUs are
present and visited more than 20 rural Niger Delta communities,
mostly by boat.' 7
Community, company, and government representatives were also
involved in the analysis of the data collected.1 72
When negotiating its second round of GMOUs, Chevron was ready
for secondary conflicts among stakeholders during negotiations. It realized
that stakeholder clashes were inevitable and that the process of resolving
those clashes would affect the level of trust that Chevron could garner
among the community members. It ensured that inevitable disagreement
would not obstruct the negotiation process by developing a process for
secondary conflict resolution: "The GMOU process has gone further than
any previous effort to address interests and concerns around how CNL
[Chevron Nigeria Ltd.] and communities work through difficult substantive

167. See Hoben, Kovick, Plumb & Wright, supra note 162, at 8 ("The GMOU is stakeholder
engagement mechanism built around formal signed agreements with clusters of communities impacted
by Chevron's on-shore operations in Nigeria. It helps to manage proactively the overall relationship
between the company and impacted communities, which have a combined population of about
850,000. It also is a community development tool that channels millions of dollars into communityidentified projects each year. Chevron has GMOUs with eight community clusters, each of which has
formed of a Regional Development Council composed of community representatives. The councils
take primary responsibility for identifying and implementing development projects. A management
board oversees the RDC and is comprised of representatives from the government, Chevron, NGOs
and the community.")

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id
Id
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challenges."1 73 It also made sure that stakeholders collaborated on the
process for resolving secondary conflicts:
The creation and implementation of the GMOUs and RDCs has
given community stakeholders a larger role in setting the terms of
the conversation, and the process for interacting. This shift has
created a greater sense of fairness in the process. It is a step towards
overcoming the long-standing perception of a power imbalance
between the company and communities, and it creates some of the
74
key conditions for productive interaction and problem solving.1
Like Wilmar, Chevron invested time in designing a framework for
negotiations, including dispute resolution
3. Summary
Neither the Wilmar nor Chevron examples concerned collaboration on
the institutional design of a grievance mechanism. Instead, the negotiations
concerned the resolution of primary conflicts between the parties, such as
land ownership and distribution of economic benefits. However, in both
examples, the parties knew that there would be disagreement and that they
needed a way to resolve those disagreements. In each case, the parties
invested in pre-negotiation development of strategies for resolving these
secondary conflicts. The frameworks that emerged for secondary conflict
resolution can help guide stakeholders when they engage in the institutional
design of grievance mechanisms.
B. Strategiesfor Building Trust by Contracting
Public law's contribution to the study of procedural fairness is well
understood. Due to this recognition, this Article will provide only a brief
discussion of procedural justice. Although not obvious, contract law also
has important contributions to make to the study of procedural fairness.
Specifically, contract law scholars study how formal contracts serve valuable
functions in building trust between strangers, even among those with
adverse interests.
The study of procedural fairness from both areas of law reveals certain
points of intersection. First, both contract law and public law illustrate that
distributional effects are relevant to but not necessarily dispositive of a
party's compliance with outcomes. An individual who loses a court case may
5
still view the process as fair and accept the outcome.17 Similarly, a party
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id.
175. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff& Tom R. Tyler, Proceduraljusticeand the Rule ofLaw: Fostering
Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 4 (2011).
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may accept another's contract offer not because it maximizes her wealth but
because she perceives the offer as fair. Therefore, the process of reaching
an outcome can matter as much as the actual outcomes reached.
Second, both areas of law also reveal that motivational inferences
matter. In order to cooperate, many people need to believe that the other
parties are motivated to be fair.1 76 Processes used for decision-making,
including dispute resolution, serve as signals of each party's capacity and
willingness to engage in a trustworthy manner.
However, it is important to examine contract law's insight
independently because it shows how trust is created between unfamiliar,
even antagonistic, parties through the contracting process. In fact, the
contracting process can be viewed as a trust-building exercise that creates a
foundation of informal norms upon which the parties' exchange
relationship is based. For example, pre-contractual negotiations and nonbinding agreements help parties build cooperative norms and gauge the
other party's trustworthiness. These assets ensure "buy-in" by the parties
even if they did not receive everything they wanted from the deal. In this
way, the benefits of contracting lie in its instrumental value to endogenize
trust within relationships.
1. Proceduraljustice
Tom Tyler's research on normative theories of compliance reveals
certain values that "lead people to comply voluntarily with legal rules and
the decisions of legal authorities."' 7 7 Tyler's research reveals that an
institution's legitimacy is not a result of its ability "to deliver tangible positive
outcomes to self-interested citizens."1 78 Instead, Tyler finds that
"[p]rocedural justice is the key normative judgment influencing the impact
of experience on legitimacy."l 79 According to his research, "[v]iews about
authority are strongly connected to judgments of the fairness of the
procedures through which authorities make decisions." 80
Tyler argues that particular factors influence individual perceptions of
whether a procedure was fair: voice, neutrality, trust, and interpersonal
qualities (treated politely and with respect).' 8' Voice refers to an

176. TYLER, supra note 5, at 164; Tom R Tyler, What Is Proceduraljusdce?:Giteria Used y Ctitens
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 103, 129 (1988) [hereinafter What is
ProceduralJusice?|;Scott, supra note 9, at 1664.
177. TYLER, se;pra note 5, at 164.

178. Id. at 163.
179. Id at 162.
180. Id
181. See id. at 163-64; Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 175, at 6; Rebecca HollanderBlumoff & Tom R_ Tyler, ProceduralJustice in Negotiation: ProceduralFairness, Outcome Acceptance, and
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"opportunity to take part in the decision-making process," including a
82
chance to present arguments that are considered by the decision-makers.1
Procedures are also seen as fair when individuals have confidence that the
decision-making process is neutral and unbiased with issues decided
83
Inferences about
consistently and based on objective information.1
the authorities
"When
act:
authorities
how
of
a
result
are
trustworthiness
views of the
the
considered
and
to
provide evidence that they have listened
how to
about
parties, and tried to take them into account in thinking
84
respond to the issues, they are viewed as more trustworthy."1 In the
absence of a third-party decision-maker, trust is produced when individuals
believe that the other is motivated to act fairly and in good faith.185
People also evaluate procedural fairness through the lens of their own
treatment: "Fair treatment by an authority can reveal that one is a valued, or
not valued, member of a group, which in turn has the potential to affect
86
one's self-esteem, one's sense of self-worth, and one's social identity."1 It
is therefore critical that authorities treat individuals subject to their authority
with respect and dignity. 8 7 Such treatment is also important because it can
determine individuals' inferences about whether the authorities are
motivated to act fairly.1 88 Tyler concludes,
The obligation to obey is based on trust of authorities. Only if
people can trust authorities, rules, and institutions can they believe
that their own long-term interests are served by loyalty toward the
organization . . . . It is being unfairly treated that disrupts the

relationship

of legitimacy to compliance, not receiving poor

189

outcomes.

'

Perceptions of procedural justice subsequently affect individual deference
90
and compliance with decisions rendered through fair processes.1 This is
because "the procedural justice of the decision-making process leads them
9
to conclude that the decision making authority is legitimate."'

Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 492 (2008); What is ProceduralJustice?, supra note 176,

at 128-30.
182. TYLER, supra note 5, at 163.

183. Id. at 163-164; Hollander-Blumoff& Tyler, supra note 175, at 6; Hollander-Blumoff& Tyler,
ProceduralJusticein Negotiation, supra note 181, at 492.
184. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 175, at 6.
185. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, Proceduraljusticein Negotiation, supra note 181, at 492.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supranote 175, at 6.
TYLER, supra note 5, at 164.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, smpra note 175, at 6.
Id. at 7.
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Expectations of fairness are not confined to the judicial setting. Parties
carry these expectations with them into a variety of alternative dispute
resolution settings, including negotiation.1 92 People "are more likely to
accept and adhere to a negotiated agreement when they believe that the
negotiation was conducted in a fair manner." 193 Within negotiation,
"individuals form judgments about whether or not they were treated fairly
by assessing whether or not they were afforded a voice, were treated with
courtesy and respect, and trusted the other party."1 94 Trust is particularly
determinative of perceptions of procedural justice in negotiations.19 5
Adherence to these values in negotiations can therefore increase the
likelihood of acceptance of the negotiated agreement and increased
information disclosure regarding value-creating opportunities. 196 Similar
results have also been found in the mediation context. 197
2. The PrivateLaw Contribution
The section below describes contract law's insight into the relationship
between trust and contracting and explains the significance of this insight
for corporate approaches to procedural fairness.
Contract law is important to the study of procedural fairness because it
offers ways to create trust between strangers. According to Ronald Gilson,
Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott, "[P]arties today often treat trust as
endogenous, as an object of contracting rather than as a precondition."' 98
Their critical insight is that a relationship between parties is not stuck with
its initial endowment - or deficit - of trust. Instead, the interaction of
formal and informal contract elements can build trust within collaborative
arrangements between parties.
In order to demonstrate the trust-building potential of contracts,
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott address the problem of inter-firm collaborations
regarding innovation. Potential collaborators encounter uncertainty because
parties cannot know in advance the nature or characteristics of the products
that their collaboration may produce.' 99 The parties also encounter each
other as strangers in a context where trust is low. The uncertainty regarding
the likelihood and nature of the collaboration makes formal contracting
inappropriate at this stage of the parties' relationship: there is not much to

192. Id. at 17.
193. Id.
194. Id.; Hollander-Blumoff& Tyler, Proceduraljustice in Negotiation, spra note 181, at 492.

195. Id. at 494.
196. Id at 493.
197. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 313, 327 (1993).
198. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, skpra note 9, at 1404.

199. See id at 1383.
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contract about. 200 Instead, their collaboration is more likely to be governed
by informal norms of cooperation. Unfortunately, these informal norms are
also weak at the beginning of the collaboration because of the parties'
unfamiliarity with each other. As such, informal norms have limited
potential to bind the parties as guarantees of cooperation. To address these
challenges, Gilson, Sabel, and Scott introduce the concept of "braiding."
Braiding refers to a process of "using formal contracting to endogenize
20
increased trust by making the parties' capabilities and character observable." 1
Formal contracting creates the conditions for informal norms to flourish.
This is important because informal norms will serve as the primary
202
But because these
guarantors of cooperation in early collaborations.
formal contracting
collaboration,
a
of
norms are weak at the beginning
creates governance processes that facilitate the growth and effectiveness of
informal norms of cooperation during the collaboration stage. 203 In this way,
formal contracting is instrumental and plays a supporting role to the work
of informal norms that draws the parties closer. The role of formal contracts
in braiding is to create processes that reveal each party's behavior to the
204
other in a way that facilitates the growth of informal norms.
One such strategy is to use formal contracts to mandate information
205
Mandated information sharing
sharing that would otherwise not occur.
allows the parties to learn about each other, especially their capabilities and
206
propensities for cooperation.
The processes established by formal contracts provide opportunities for
parties to learn about each other, particularly regarding their capacities and
207
These processes improve transparency in
problem-solving approaches.
collaborations, but not only regarding outcomes and progress towards
benchmarks. They also reveal important information on the nature of the
collaborators, which is important in order to build trust.
This interplay between formal and informal contracts demonstrates
how the former buttresses the development and effectiveness of the latter.

&

200. Parties' efforts are not contractible ex ante because of uncertainty regarding the likelihood
and goals of the collaboration and each party's role in achieving those goals. Once this uncertainty is
resolved during the initial collaboration process, parties approach an end game scenario where these
issues become clear. At this point, the parties' efforts can be contractible ex post. See Gilson, Sabel
Scott, spra note 9, at 1408.
201. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at 1386 (emphasis added).
202. See id. at 1402.
203. See id.
204. See id at 1403.
205. See id
206. See id; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, ContractingforInnovation:
Vervical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 472 (2009) ("[In these
contracts, formal contracting operates importantly to facilitate the development of informal
contracting structures that police the parties' expectations of capability, cooperation, and trust.").
207. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at 1403; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 206, at 473.
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Significantly, braiding demonstrates a way to use formal contract design to
facilitate the development of powerful informal norms - such as trust
where none existed before. This strategy of interweaving formal and
informal contracts is not confined to the technology sector. Instead, Gilson,
Sabel, and Scott explain that this technique arises when the "precise goal
and manner of achieving it only become clear in the course of the parties'
collaboration." 208
Robert Scott's theory of reciprocal fairness also emphasizes the role of
agreements in encouraging information sharing between parties regarding
important dispositional attributes. Once again, agreements are used to
improve transparency between parties regarding their propensities. In this
context, the propensity that is revealed is a party's ability and willingness to
reciprocate. According to Scott, reciprocity "means that individuals respond
cooperatively to generous acts and, conversely, punish non-cooperative
behavior." 209
Fairness matters to parties in contracting relationships. It matters so
much that parties behave reciprocally towards others even when such
reciprocity is inconsistent with pure self-interest. 210 Perceptions of fairness
provide clues to parties about the nature and intentions of their counterparts
on the other side of the bargaining table. 211 Signals of fairness or unfairness
are so strong that parties will reward or punish such behavior, respectively,

even when such action comes at a cost to themselves. 212 The preferences
for fairness are not limited to individuals. Groups of individuals in regime
settings may also share proclivities towards reciprocal fairness. 213
For reciprocity to serve as an extra-legal mechanism of contract
enforcement, there must be an opportunity for parties to exhibit to each
other their propensity to cooperate and act fairly. Scott argues that this
information-gathering function is among the reasons that parties enter into
informal agreements with indefinite terms that courts refuse to enforce. 214
Examples of such agreements are "comfort agreements" that are informal
"agreement[s] to agree," such as agreements to lease space, execute
executive compensation packages, or enter into a partnership. 215 Scott

208. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at 1385.

209. Robert E. Scott, The Death of ContractLaw, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 383 (2004).
210. See Scott, Jopra note 9, at 1667.

211. See id.
212. See id.; Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing InternationalAgreementsand the Limits
ofCoerion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 555-56 (2004); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS
OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 88-91

(2006).
213. Scott & Stephan, supra note 212, at 594-96; SCOTr & STEPHAN, supranote 212, at 88-91.
214. Scott, supra note 9, at 1645, 1683.

215. Id. at 1682-83.
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hypothesizes that the "widespread use of informal comfort agreements may
be a function of their propensities as screens for voluntarily cooperative
behavior." 216 Comfort agreements create opportunities for reciprocity,
thereby encouraging mutual learning regarding the party's preferences for
reciprocal fairness. 217
Scott's insight is supported by sociological and experimental economic
research on social exchanging. 218 This research finds that parties perceive
their counterparties' actions as more fair when they participate in reciprocal
219
Negotiated exchange is when
exchange instead of negotiated exchange.
in which they seek
"actors engage in a joint decision-making process ...
220
By contrast, in
simultaneously.
exchange"
of
terms
the
on
agreement
are separately
exchange
reciprocal exchange, "actors' contributions to
22
initiate
"[a]ctors
performed and non-negotiated." 1 In reciprocal exchange,
exchanges individually by performing a beneficial act for another (such as
giving assistance or advice) without knowing whether, when, or to what
222
extent the other will reciprocate."
Although negotiated exchange may initially appear to have more
hallmarks of procedural fairness (collective decision-making, equal
223
opportunities for voice, informed consent on terms, binding agreement),
it also minimizes the potential for reciprocity; that is its weakness.

224

225

Those who
Reciprocity is valued in itself, independent of outcomes.
consistently reciprocate others' gifts are seen as more fair exchange
partners. 226 Even if the distributional outcomes are the same in both a
negotiated and reciprocal exchange, parties will perceive each other as more
227
fair under the latter.
Why is that? One possible explanation is that parties value the risks that
the other takes when they allocate benefits sequentially (reciprocal
216. Id at 1685. Scott explains that there are two ways in which comfort agreements serve as a
screening device: "First, the agreement provides opportunities to observe the behavior of the promisor
in response to opportunities to reciprocate . . . . [Second], the comfort agreement serves to separate m
time the opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that is ultimately contemplated.
It is thus an example of the expenditure of time for the purposes of communication." Id. at 1684-85.
217. Id at 1683.
218. See Linda D. Molm, Gretchen Peterson & Nobuyuki Takahashi, In the Eye of the Beholder
ProceduralJustice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. Soc. REv. 128, 148 (2003); Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A.
McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, BehavioralFoundationsof Reciprocity: ExperimentalEconomics and Evolutionary

Psychology, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 335, 350 (1998).
219. See Molm, Peterson & Takahashi, supra note 218, at 130.

220. Id
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 149.

224. See id. at 150.
225. Id.
226. Id at 148-49.
227. Id. at 148.
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exchange) as opposed to simultaneously (negotiated exchange) where the
terms are agreed upon at the same time even if performance is sequenced.
Reciprocal exchanges do not carry the same guarantees of return or benefit.
For that reason, these exchanges may send stronger signals of the giver's
disposition and motivations. Sequential resource allocation through
reciprocal exchanges also creates opportunities for vulnerability, which is an
important factor for trust-building. 228 In order to trust, the initial giver must
expose himself to the risk of harm. 229 This demonstration of vulnerability
and willingness to trust speaks to the giver's character and also to the giver's
faith in the other party. Specifically, it communicates that the giver believes
that the other party is trustworthy. The trusted party may therefore want to
reward the giver's trust in them and validate the risk the giver took. As such,
each cycle of reciprocity endogenizes trust between the parties and
strengthens their relationship.
3. What ContractDesign Teaches Us About Trust
The insights discussed above should also apply to building trust among
stakeholders in the institutional design of grievance mechanisms. This
process shares some of the key features of the contract situations discussed
above. When stakeholders come together to create a grievance mechanism,
they may lack a clear idea of the project's feasibility and whether they can
collaborate with each other to develop a grievance mechanism that all parties
can accept and respect. They often do not trust each other, doubting the
other's capacity and willingness to behave in a trustworthy manner. Even if
they do embark on the process of institutional design, they will not know
what the end result will be when they begin the institutional design process.
The grievance mechanism will only take shape during the collaboration.
This situation of uncertainty and mistrust qualifies the institutional
design process for many of the contract design lessons discussed above.
First, Gilson, Sabel, and Scott's research reveals that formal contracts
have a role to play even when the ultimate guarantee of cooperation lies in
informal norms. This is the supportive, facilitative role of formal contracting
that demonstrates its ability to buttress other norms of cooperation.
In the discussion above, formal contracts improved transparency
between parties so that the parties could observe each other's behavior and
228. See Mark Weber, Deepak Malhotra & Keith Murnighan, The Trust Development Process,

ROTMAN MAGAZINE, Fall 2006, at 36 (defining trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention
to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another");
Jeffrey H. Dyer & Wujin Chu, The Determinantsof Trust in Supplier-Automaker Relationshis in the U.S.,
Japan, andKorea, 31 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 259, 260 (2000) (defining trust as "one party's confidence that
the other party in the exchange relationship will not exploit its vulnerabilities'"; Deepak Malhotra, Trust
and Reariy Decsions: The D/ering Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 61, 61 (2004).

229. Malhotra, supra note 228, at 62.
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evaluate the other's potential as a collaborator. What is revealed varies by
context. The information that is necessary for collaboration in a technology
context will differ from the information that is needed among stakeholders
creating a grievance mechanism. Regardless of these differences, the point
is to use formal agreements to mandate information-sharing between parties
regarding qualities that each deems vital for trust and cooperation.
Second, parties need opportunities to demonstrate their inclination and
capacity to be fair. Informal "agreements to agree" can offer such
opportunities to exhibit cooperative norms early on in a new relationship.
The willingness to invest time in such agreements also sends strong signals
230
Similarly, parties
to parties about the other's preference for reciprocity.
should create opportunities to demonstrate their capacity and willingness to
reciprocate. Sequenced exchanging can offer parties opportunities to act
beneficially and invite reciprocity.
Of course, there are some important differences that distinguish
grievance mechanisms. First, some grievance processes are followed by
formal settlements that outline the parties' settlement of the dispute and
231
govern subsequent behavior. But the use of formal agreements at the end
game stage does not preclude the ability to braid the process that leads up
to those agreements. The difference is uncertainty. During the institutional
design process, the parties are uncertain about whether they can agree on
the mandate and features of a grievance mechanism. They begin
collaboration but they cannot specify ex ante particular duties of the parties
during this process. The noncontractible nature of their efforts means that
they will largely rely on informal norms of cooperation to govern their
substantive performances during this initial collaboration process. Formal
contracting during this stage simply improves the effectiveness of the
informal norms.
This situation changes when the parties have completed the design
process. At the end stage, uncertainty dissipates, as the parties are aware of
their collective goals and the means to reach them. The features of the
roles.
grievance mechanism or resolution become clear and so do the parties'
subsequent
The
features.
At this stage, they can contract regarding these
formal agreements do not threaten the braiding process so long as there is
a "clear distinction between the information exchange and dispute
resolution mechanisms that support the informal contract . .. and the high232
This separation between the two
powered formal contractual regime."
"prevents the formal incentives of the latter from crowding out the informal
233
behavior induced by the former."
230. See Scott, supranote 9, at 1685.
231. See supra notes 161-62 (discussing the Wilmar agreements).

232. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at 1409.
233. Id
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The second main difference relates to switching costs. In innovation
agreements, heightened transparency increases the endowment of trust and
cooperation between the parties that in turn reduces the likelihood of
switching partners because of search costs. Switching risks are not as
frequently implicated in the extractive sector because of limited substitution

possibilities: the parties are often stuck with each other. The value of
braiding in this context is not to prevent switching but to improve trust and
cooperative norms within these locked-in relationships.
The situation changes when we move from the extractive sectors to
other industries, such as garment manufacturing or electronics assembly. In
these sectors, corporations enjoy substitution possibilities because they can
source elsewhere. In these contexts, braiding can help build relationships
between the parties that may discourage or reduce the likelihood of
switching by the corporation. Through braiding, the process of ex ante
institutional design of grievance mechanisms, such as dispute resolution,
creates a valuable venue for parties to demonstrate their partnership
qualities.
The following examples demonstrate different ways of implementing
the insight of Gilson, Sabel, and Scott in stakeholder engagement.
4. Strategiesfor Building Trust Among Stakeholders: Wilmar Group in Indonesia
The dispute between Wilmar Group and the local residents in Indonesia
was characterized by a high level of mistrust.234 Residents from Senuju,
Sajingan Kecil, and Sasak perceived Wilmar as encroaching upon their land
and feared that Wilmar's operations would jeopardize their livelihood. 235
Community members had little faith in a dialogue process with Wilmar
because they claimed that they had been let down by the results of previous
dialogues. 236
In order to renew the residents' faith in a dialogue process, CAO
engaged both parties in trust-building exercises. At least one side - the
residents - needed to be convinced of Wilmar's trustworthiness as a
precondition of participation in a grievance resolution process. CAO
answered this need and used it as an opportunity for Wilmar to signal its
intentions and commitment to the grievance process.
The residents identified two conditions to their cooperation in a
dialogue process: cessation of operations by Wilmar on its plantations and
234. INT'L FIN. CORP./MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, PRELIMINARY STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENT: REGARDING
COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY CONCERNS IN RELATION TO ACTIVITIES OF THE WILMAR GROUP
OF COMPANIES 9 (2007).

235. Id.
236. Id.
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237
Wilmar agreed to a
suspension of purchases from Duta Palma.
offered by Wilmar
signal
strong
a
was
this
clearance;
land
on
moratorium
238
negotiations
positive
subsequent
The
that it would negotiate in good faith.
can be attributed to these early signaling acts. According to Scott's theory of
reciprocal fairness, "individuals respond cooperatively to generous acts, and,
239
Parties need an
conversely, punish non-cooperative behavior."
and fairness.
cooperation
towards
propensity
their
prove
opportunity to
The parties also used a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to build
trust.240 As a process, the MOU provided the parties with a small-stakes
setting to evaluate the other side's trustworthiness. By reaching an MOU,
the parties were reassured that agreement - at least on some issues - was
possible with the other side. They also participated in joint mapping
exercises, whereby the parties collaborated on identifying the lands in
dispute. 241 In other words, the parties used agreements to establish
interactions - joint mapping exercises and MOU process - that served
information-gathering functions as screens for voluntary cooperative
behavior.
Of course, it is worth querying the level of trust the local stakeholders
experienced in their negotiations with Wilmar. The two indicia of trust are:
(a) two agreements were reached between the parties, and (b) neither of the
parties abandoned the mediation-dialogue process.

5. Strategiesfor Building Trust Among Stakeholders: Chevron in the Niger Delta

-

In order to understand why mistrust plagued its first set of GMOUs,
Chevron engaged in a participatory evaluation process. This process
provided Chevron with some insight into the roots of mistrust between it
and local stakeholders. The evaluations revealed that the communities felt
that the GMOU model had been thrust upon them without their
consultation or consent. Additionally, the communities were not satisfied
regarding the incorporation of their views and concerns into the negotiation
process. This insight informed Chevron's re-negotiation strategy for the
next set of GMOUs in which it "'proposed' - rather than imposed
242
process design, time frames, venues and facilitators."

237. Id.
238. Resolving Land Disputes in the Palm Oil Sector Through CollaborativeMediation: CA0 Ombudsman
Wilmar Group Conclusion Report, OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE
Intervention in Sambas, Indonesia ADvISOR/OMBL)DSMAN 2 (2009), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/docume
nts/WilmarConclusionreport-OctO9.pdf [hereinafter CAO Report].
239. Scott, supra note 209, at 383.
240. Id.
241. Close Out Report, supra note 155, at 2.
242. Hoben, Kovick, Plumb & Wright, supra note 162, at 14.
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Chevron incorporated many indicia of procedural and reciprocal
fairness. Regarding the former, Chevron improved representation in
decision-making in order to provide community members with greater
participation opportunities. Chevron's previous method for selecting its
negotiating partners among the community members and local leaders was
not trusted because those chosen were not seen as representative of the
broader community base. 243 Under the new approach, community members
determined representation, including the governing body's composition and
selection of members. 244 Chevron also engaged in joint agenda setting so
that it was not the only one identifying the issues for negotiation and
engagement. 245 The GMOU model was also structured in a way that vested
a great deal of decision-making in the local communities.
Chevron improved the neutrality of the process by engaging impartial
facilitators to lead it and the other stakeholders through the process of
designing an evaluation process of the GMOUs and renegotiating a second
round of GMOUs. 246 It also relied on local NGOs to broker relationships
between itself and the local communities. 247
Finally, Chevron knew that it confronted a significant trust deficit and
that it needed trust in order for its community engagement to work. It built
trust incrementally in a manner that allowed for reciprocity under Scott's
theory of fairness:
The GMOU was established in a context of substantial mistrust, and
nobody presumed that trust could be built overnight. Rather, the
GMOU provided opportunities for both company and communities
to begin to make commitments and deliver on those commitments,
to demonstrate that they could each be credible counterparts, and to
build trust incrementally through that process. 248
In order to allow trust to grow, Chevron lowered the stakes. By adopting
GMOUs with fixed time limits - three years - it allowed the parties to
move forward with the security that, if they were unhappy with the model,
they could change it after a few years. Importantly, and similarly to Wilmar,
Chevron engaged in joint problem-solving with its stakeholders. It sat
"shoulder to shoulder" with them in designing a process for evaluating the
first three years of the GMOU. It continued to maintain this stance during
the analysis of the data.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
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This joint problem-solving assisted Chevron with improving the
249
First, it communicated important
acceptability of its GMOU approach.
designing the evaluation process
By
motivational inferences about Chevron.
with other stakeholders, Chevron signaled that it wanted accurate
information and that it was genuinely interested in what community
members thought about the GMOU model. Second, the inclusion of
community members communicated that Chevron valued their opinions.
Finally, it was critical that the first experiment in joint problem solving
occurred prior to negotiations when the stakes were lower: "Had these
process elements been introduced during the renegotiations, when
perceived stakes were higher, they might not have been given the chance to
succeed." 250 The lesson from this experience is that "companies,
communities and neutral third parties might be well-served by looking for
opportunities to lower the stakes of initial engagement, when mistrust is
severe." 251 This pre-negotiation joint problem solving achieves results
similar to "agreements to agree." Both allow parties to gauge the disposition
and motivations of each other.
6. Conclusions
This section illustrates ways that contracts can assist with trust-building
between stakeholders during the institutional design process. These
illustrations are subject to two conditions. First, use of contracts facilitates
trust-building, but they are not sufficient on their own. Unlike many
contracts in commercial contexts, the participants in stakeholder design
experience significant asymmetries in power and information in relation to
the corporation. 252 That is why the use of contracts should be supplemented
253
by capacity building, training, and the assistance of a third party facilitator.
For example, in the Wilmar dispute resolution process, CAO prepared the
parties for the mediation process, including "build[ing] their capacity for
dialogue, shar[ing] information effectively with the wider community, and
254
creat[ing] consensus around important decisions during the negotiations."
Second, the benefit of contracts in these situations is that they served as
early signals of trust-building. Although contracts served these functions in
the illustrations above, this function is not limited to contracts. Other acts
can also accomplish similar purposes.

249. The consensus-building approach adopted by Chevron is consistent with other studies of
good practices. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 53.
250. See Hoben, Kovick, Plumb & Wright, supra note 162, at 17.
251. Id.
252. Knuckey &Jenkin, supra note 73, at 812.
253. Telephone Interview with International Mediator (December 22, 2014) (on file with author).
254. Close Out Report, supra note 155, at 3.
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V. THE STEWARDSHIP OF TRUST FRAMEWORK: RESOLUTION OF
PRIMARY CONFLICTS

This Article argues that the level of trust that stakeholders place in a
grievance mechanism is not only a product of its attributes during the
operational stage. Instead, trust-building during the stages of standardsetting and institutional design facilitates the level of trust a grievance
mechanism commands during its operational stage.
However, a mechanism's attributes during its operational stage still
matters (see Figure 4). This section explores two of these critical attributes:
centralizationandjudiialiZation. Centralization refers to the global coverage of
the grievance mechanism, whether run by public or private actors.
Judicialization refers to the similarity of dispute resolution processes to
judicial procedures. This section evaluates these attributes according to the
framework for trust-building developed in this Article. It concludes that
decentralized, non-judicial mechanisms may offer the best opportunities for
cultivating trust. This conclusion runs counter to traditional expectations for
international accountability that favor international courts. At a time when
there is an increasing trend towards judicialization, the following section
illustrates the merits of an alternative approach: counter-judicialization.

Standard-Setting
S dt

Institutional

Operational

Design

Stage

Figure 4: The operationalstage in private institutionaldevelopment.
A. Extent of Centrali.Zation

A grievance mechanism can operate at many points on the spectrum of
centralization, from highly contextualized bodies to uniform institutions
that apply across value chains and borders. Each has its own particular
advantages and disadvantages. Highly centralized mechanisms concentrate
the resolution of disputes across a broad geographic area within one or two
bodies. For example, one group of lawyers has proposed an International
Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights. 255 Like all grievance
mechanisms, this tribunal is meant to provide remedies to victims of human
rights abuses who are currently without options. It is modeled on
international commercial arbitration. Perhaps the most ambitious aspect of
255. Claes Cronstedt, Remarks at the United Nations Annual Forum on Business and Human
Rights (Dec. 3, 2014) (transcript available at http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/
documents/CC%20Geneve%203%2ODec%202014A.pdf) [hereinafter Cronstedt Remarks].
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the tribunal is its coverage. It could hear disputes from anywhere around the
world concerning a diversity of disputes, ranging from labor violations,
256
The diversity of these
discrimination claims, and environmental actions.
claims reflects an even greater diversity in the claimants, respondent
companies, and the nature of the company's business (e.g. extractive sector,
agribusiness, garments, electronics). Although the parties would have the
power to decide whether to use the tribunal and what issues to submit to it,
the potential range of the tribunal is extensive.
Another example is the grievance process of the Ethical Trading
Initiative (ETI). ETI "is an alliance of UK-based companies, NGOs and
trade union organizations working to promote and improve the
implementation of corporate Codes of Practice which cover supply chain
working conditions.' '257
ETI provides a grievance mechanism by which any ETI member can
258
raise complaints against a corporate member or its supplier. The grievance
mechanism used by ETI has a more narrow scope than that of the proposed
tribunal discussed above because ETI only focuses on violations of the ETI
259
However, this one
Base Code, which primarily concerns labor rights.
organization can address complaints covering a broad geographic area. For
example, ETI addressed labor violations by a supplier in Cambodia that
resulted in an agreement by management to provide compensation and
training and permit union access. 260 It also helped negotiate an agreement in
Turkey between a union and a supplier following the latter's dismissal of
workers. 261
A decentralized model, however, offers two significant advantages:
proximity and inclusiveness. Many of those who study international criminal
justice warn about the dangers of distance. As distance between an
international court and its primary constituency grows, so do the risks of
miscommunication, misunderstanding, and political manipulation. An
international court or other dispute resolution body may compromise its
legitimacy in the eyes of the local population when it is located far away
from

them.262 According

to Laura

Dickinson,

the location

of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the
256. Id. at 7.
257. Rees & Vermijs, svpra note 4, at 42.
258. Id.
259. Id
260. Resolving Complaints, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/inaction/resolving-violations.

261. Id
262. See William W. Burke-White, Regionaliation of International Criminal I-am Enforcement: A
Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 735-36 (2003) (explaining that regional enforcement
mechanisms are more likely to exhibit the "psychological proximity and sense of connection between
the tribunal and the local community, upon which legitimacy depends").
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Hague, instead of where the atrocities occurred, contributed to a situation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina where even judges and lawyers were "illinformed about the ICTY's work, and were often suspicious of its motives
and its results." 263

-

Distance also compromises the potential for restorative justice. William
Burke-White provides an example where "thousands of miles and transoceanic flights separating witnesses and evidence from the court"
compromised societal healing in the wake of the atrocities in Bosnia. 264
Proximity also facilitates local capacity building, including the
development of local legal institutions and training of legal practitioners. 265
Proximity offers strong arguments in favor of decentralization but it is
not enough. Even hybrid courts - located in places where the atrocities
occurred - suffer from a lack of local legitimacy when they exclude local
actors from the design and implementation of the courts. Decentralization
therefore matters not only because it increases proximity, whether physical
or psychological, but also because it increases inclusiveness by involving
local actors.
According to Jaya Ramji-Nogales, the participation of local actors in the
institutional design processes for these transitional justice mechanisms
increases the likelihood of perceived legitimacy. 266 This perception is critical
in order for these local actors - victims, perpetrators, and political elites
to develop and internalize norms against the commission of these atrocities
in the future. 267 Ramji-Nogales acknowledges that it is impossible to please
everyone, but she argues that it is "possible to improve contemporary
transitional justice mechanisms by considering all of these perspectives
during the design process in order to increase perceptions of legitimacy by
as many players as possible." 268 The inclusion of local actors during
institutional design allows the resulting mechanism to conform to local
traditions, expectations, and cultural practices. 269
For example, in the Mexican electronics industry, the CEREALCANIETI dispute resolution process illustrates a decentralized approach to
dispute resolution. Many leading global electronics companies manufacture
263. Laura Dickinson, The Promise offlybrid Courts, 97 Am.

J. 1NT'L L.

295, 302 (2003) (explaining

that perceived legitimacy was also reduced by failure of ICTY to publicize its work, lack of local
participation, and predominant use of an unfamiliar legal tradition); see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note

8, at 28.
264. Burke-White, supra note 262, at 735-36.
265. Dickinson, supra note 263, at 303-04; Burke-White, supra note 265, at 735-36.
266. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 8, at 17.
267. See id.; see also id. at 18 ("[A] transitional justice mechanism that is viewed as legitimate by as
many perpetrators as possible because it incorporates as many of their interests as possible will be more
effective than one that ignores the interests of perpetrators entirely.").

268. Id at 21.
269. See id. at 24; Burke-White, supra note 262, at 737.
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270
Although a number of
their products from supplier factories in Mexico.
in the Code of
standards
the
to
commit
companies
large branded electronic
Conduct of the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), the
Mexican electronics industry is characterized by significant human rights
abuses. 271
The need to address these human rights abuses led to the creation of an
industry-wide grievance mechanism in Mexico's electronics sector. This
mechanism is managed through an affiance between two important
organizations: CANIETI (National Chamber of the Electronic,
Telecommunications and Information Technologies Industry) and
CEREAL (Centre for Reflection and Action on Labour Issues). Workers
can use the mechanism to challenge conduct by any company member of
CANIETI and the EICC Code of Conduct serves as the reference point for

these complaints.
As a decentralized approach, "[t]he structure of the [CEREALCANIETI dispute resolution mechanism] largely reflects employment
272
This sector is
dynamics in the Guadalajara electronics industry."
characterized by a strong and cohesive business association that can
pressure industry participants to use the dispute resolution mechanism
available. This cohesiveness is partially explained by the fact that many of
the firm managers are Mexican and built their careers within the electronics
273
cluster in Mexico.
Additionally, the Jesuit roots of CEREAL affected the ability of
CEREAL to carry out its labor activities in Mexico: "Ifn some cases, firm
managers have agreed to meet with and discuss labor rights issues with
CEREAL-GDL because of their personal ties to the Jesuit institution. For
example, some managers studied at Jesuit secondary and higher education
schools." 274
Although these advantages are considerable, decentralization also offers
another important benefit: opportunities for trust-building. As Section IV
explained, the trust and legitimacy that a dispute resolution mechanism
commands is a product of trust-building during its institutional
development. These processes allow the affected parties to understand, even
shape, the objectives and capacities of the resulting grievance mechanism,
thereby increasing the likelihood that they will perceive it as legitimate. More
270. Electronics Multinationals and Labour Rigbts in Mexico: Second Report on Working Conditions in the
Mexican Electronics Industry, CENTRE FOR REFLECTION AND ACTION ON LABOUR ISSUES (CEREAL)
10 (2007), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Cereal-

Report-English-Oct-2007.pdf.
271. Id at 12.
272. Hector Salazar Salame, Worker Rights Protection in Mexico's Si&on Vally: Confronting Low-Road
Labor Practices in I-lgh-Tech Manufacturing Through Antagonistic Collaboration60 (2011) (unpublished MCP
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69456.

273. Id. at 15.
274. Id at 13.
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importantly, institutional design offers opportunities for trust-building
among a group of stakeholders with diverse needs and interests who are
unaccustomed to trusting each other. These opportunities are lost when
local stakeholders are excluded from the institutional design process, which
is often the case with centralized dispute resolution mechanisms that have
the world as their audience.

B. Extent ofJudicialiyation
By definition, non-judicial grievance mechanisms are not courts.
Instead, they can use a variety of processes for resolving grievances. In
addition to adjudication, grievance mechanisms use investigation,
information facilitation, negotiation, mediation and conciliation, and
arbitration. 275 Some of these processes are more "judicialized" than others,
such as arbitration, which uses binding decision-making by a third party.
Other processes offer different pathways to resolution and provide
opportunities for parties to resolve differences. These are interesting
developments given the trend towards judicialization in other areas of
international law. This section provides examples of judicialized and nonjudicialized processes and evaluates these options for trust-building
according to the framework developed in this Article.
At the judicialized end of the spectrum, there are grievance mechanisms
that favor arbitration. Some companies incorporate arbitration into a multistage dispute resolution process and resort to arbitration when other
276
grievance processes fail.
Arbitration is also favored for prospective tribunals, such as the
proposed international tribunal for business and human rights discussed
above. It is modeled on international commercial arbitration. Disputes
would be resolved using arbitration; mediation would be available to address
conflicts at an early stage.277 The arbitration rules would be modeled on the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).278 Decision-makers would be chosen from a
roster of arbitrators and, critically, the decisions of the tribunal would be
enforced under the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 279 This is the multilateral treaty that facilitates
the enforcement of international arbitration awards and has contributed to
275. Rees & Vermijs, supra note 4, at 4.
276. Rees, supra note 4, at 14 (describing Gap, Inc.'s grievance process in Lesotho); id. at 19
(describing Xstrata Copper's grievance process in Peru); id. at 9 (describing BTC Pipeline's grievance
process in Azerbaijan).
277. Cronstedt Remarks, supra note 255, at 2.

278. Id
279. Id
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the growth of arbitration as the means for resolving private, cross-border
disputes.
Although sharing many of the hallmarks of international commerial
arbitration, its proponents intend to modify the tribunal to address matters
dealing with human rights. For example, the arbitrators at this tribunal
280
Additionally, the
would have special knowledge of human rights abuses.
on human
experts
technical
and
scientific
tribunal would include a "roster of
as well
arbitration
in
rights issues, who may be appointed as expert witnesses
28
as in mediation." 1
Arbitration is also the selected dispute resolution process for the
Bangladesh Accords. In the wake of the Rana Plaza crisis that killed over
1,000 people, global brands and retailers and trade unions established the
Bangladesh Accord on Fire & Building Safety. This agreement contains
several provisions to improve workplace safety at supply sites. For example,
brands and retailers finance the cost of improved standards in their
production sites, although they are given latitude in designing the precise
form of financing. 282 Additionally, under Article 24, signatory companies
also financially contribute to the Accord's programs on inspection,
remediation, and training.283 The Accord is legally binding and permits
arbitration in case of dispute. 284 Disputes are first submitted to the steering
committee.285 However, either party may request appeal of the decision to
final and binding arbitration. 286 According to Article 5,

280. Id.
281. Id. at 3. The scope of the issues heard by the tribunal is left to the individual parties. Parties
can choose to arbitrate their dispute through the use of pre-dispute contractual arbitration
arrangements, such as human rights-arbitration clauses inserted into supply contracts between
multinational companies and their suppliers. These human rights clauses would identify the
international human rights norms that are meant to be observed and would mandate arbitration before
the tribunal if these norms are violated. Outside stakeholders who are not parties to the contract may
still enforce these clauses as third-party beneficiaries. Parties may also opt for arbitration under the
tribunal once a dispute has arisen. Claes Cronstedt & Robert C. Thompson, An InternationalArbitration
Enhancing Access to Remedy, WORKING GRP. ON INT'L
Tribunal on Business & 1-uman Rights RIGHTS 7-8 (2014) http://businessARBITRATION TRIBUNAL ON Bus. & HUMAN
4
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/IntlArbitrationTribunal_-V .pdf.
282. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh T 6 (2013), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/the.accord.pdf [hereinafter Bangladesh Accord]; see also id. at T 22 ("In
order to induce Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to comply with upgrade and remediation requirements of
the program, partiipatingbrands and retailers will negotiate commerialterms with their suppliers which ensure that
it is financially feasible for the factories to maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and
remediation requirements instituted by the Safety Inspector. Each signatory company may, at its
option, use alternative means to ensure factories have the financial capacity to comply with remediation
requirements, including but not limited to joint investments, proiding loans, accessing donor or government support,
through offering business incentives or throughpayingfor renovations directly.") (emphasis added).
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id at¶ 24.
Id at 5.
Id.
Id.
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Any arbitration award shall be enforceable in a court of law of the
domicile of the signatory against whom enforcement is sought and
shall be subject to The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York
Convention), where applicable. The process for binding arbitration,
including, but not limited to, the allocation of costs relating to any
arbitration and the process for selection of the Arbitrator, shall be
governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration 1985 (with amendments as adopted in
2006).287
By contrast, many grievance processes prefer dialogue-based forms of
dispute resolution. The United Nations recommends this approach for
company-level mechanisms in particular because "a business enterprise
cannot, with legitimacy, both be the subject of complaints and unilaterally
determine their outcome." 288 There are several examples of nonadjudicatory dispute resolution processes. At the international level, the
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) of the International Finance
Corporation uses mediation, supported by fact-finding and other methods,
to help parties resolves disputes. 289 Otherwise, the CAO uses compliance
investigation processes. 290
Industry-based grievance mechanisms also adopt dialogue-based
approaches. At the international level, the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)
provides a grievance mechanism by which ETI members can raise and
resolve complaints concerning violations of the ETI Base Code. 291 One
advantage of the ETI grievance process is that "NGO and trade union
members encourage their affiliates to use the mechanism if a complaint
arises."

292

The ETI also serves as a forum for members to resolve issues

without the use of a formal complaint. 293 The ETI complaints process
involves the "company members whose suppliers are the subjects of
complaint," the trade union or NGO members raising the complaint, "the
management of the supply factory or factories involved and any
complainants who wish to be directly involved." 294 The ETI complaint
process uses investigation facilitation and dialogue to address the issues

287. Id.
288. Guiding Princileson Business andHuman Rights, supra note 6, at 27.
289.About the CAO: Our Roles, supra note 151.

290. Id.
291. ETI Code ViolationProcedure, ETHICAL TRADING INITATIVE 1, http://www.ediicaltrade. org
/sites/default/files/resources/code-violationprocedure.pdf.
292. Rees & Vermijs, supra note 4, at 42.
293. Id.; ETI Code Violation Procedure, supra note 291, at 1.
294. Rees & Vermijs, supra note 4, at 43.
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raised. 295 The complaint process is limited to members only; however, a
non-member could seek the support of an ETI member in order to advance
its complaint. 296
At the national level, the sector-wide grievance process used by
CANIETI and CEREAL also relies on dialogue-based approaches. The
process begins with a worker raising the complaint directly with firm
297
If
management, if the worker feels comfortable with such an action.
resolution is not reached between the worker and firm management, the
worker approaches CEREAL. CEREAL initiates an investigation and, if it
finds violations of the EICC or Mexican labor law, it raises labor complaints
before the mechanism. At this stage, CANIETI becomes involved by
reaching out to its members and identifies a contact within the company
concerned in the complaint. 298 The grievance process begins with direct
dialogue. 299 If this process fails, then the parties use third-party mediation
offered through the grievance mechanism. 300 If this process also fails,
301
Finally, if the
CEREAL can raise the matter to the brand-name level.
matter cannot be resolved at the brand level, CEREAL is permitted to
302
publish the case in its annual report and media.
As explained above, most grievance mechanisms addressing human
rights and other conflicts in global production do not adopt judicialized
processes. Instead, they tend to rely on dialogue-based approaches that
encourage parties to reach their own solutions. What are we to make of this
trend in favor of counter-judicialization?
In order to evaluate counter-judicialization in this context, it is worth
exploring the limitations of judicialization within the familiar, domestic
setting. Carrie Menkel-Meadow identifies several limitations of the
adversarial system within this latter setting. First, she notes that the
adversarial system depends on establishing facts in order for a judge to reach
an opinion; however, facts can be difficult to establish and different people
303
These challenges also arise in the
will interpret facts in different ways.
context of conflicts in global supply chains and overseas production sites.

295. Id.
296. ETI Code Violation Procedure,supra note 291, at 1.
297. Salame, supra note 272, at 59.
298. Brian Ganson, Resolving Labour Issues in the Electronics Industry in Mexdco, ACCESS 5 (2014),
http://accessfacility.org/access-case-story-2-resolving-labout-issues-electronics-industry-mexico.

299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Salame, supra note 272, at 59.

302. Id. at 60.
303. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble nith the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multi-Cultural

World, 1 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICs 49, 50-57 (1996).
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Parties may acknowledge the existence of a systemic problem but will not
agree on the facts, such as details surrounding a particular event. 304
Second, the adversarial system privileges binary narratives that are
usually based on the experiences of two parties. 305 The reality is that many
disputes implicate the interests of more than two parties. It is certainly true
in the context of human rights disputes involving corporations. Disputes
over land between a corporation and local inhabitants could implicate
several communities that may have their own interests. Local state actors
may also want to be involved in the process because of the effects of the
land agreements for the state and other communities. Additionally, many
local and international NGOs also seek involvement in the dispute
resolution process. These different stakeholder voices are hard to
incorporate within a dispute resolution system that is traditionally made for
two.
Finally, Menkel-Meadow argues that adversarial systems compromise
the quality of the outcomes reached. First, the ways to resolve a dispute are
limited under an adversarial system: "[E]xpanding the stories, the interests,
the issues and the things at stake actually enhances the likelihood of finding
'trades' and other creative solutions to problems so that contentious
argument can be minimized and more party needs can be satisfied." 306
Additionally, solutions imposed by judges "do not deal with underlying
causes of ongoing conflicts or disputes." 307 These challenges certainly
support counter-judicialization in the context of the corporation and its
external stakeholders. Those affected by the corporation's acts may be better
informed on the types of solutions needed compared to a third-party
decision-maker. Stakeholders may also be more willing to accept these
outcomes if they played a role in reaching the outcomes.
Of course, dialogue-based approaches are also vulnerable to their own
particular risks and evils, such as unequal bargaining power and asymmetries
in information and capacity. That is why it is critical to supplement dialogue
with capacity building and training. 308 For example, in the Wilmar dispute
resolution process, CAO prepared the parties for the mediation process,
including improving their capacity for dialogue, sharing information, and
creating consensus. 309
On balance, non-judicial approaches may be better suited to resolving
disputes involving "business and human rights." This may strike some as
surprising. When confronted with human rights violations, our impulse is
304. See Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor (Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with
author).
305. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 303, at 59, 62.

306. Id. at 63.
307. Id. at 64.
308. Telephone Interview with International Mediator (Dec. 22, 2014) (on file with author).
309. Close Out Report, supra note 155, at 3.
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to answer the accountability gap in international law with a robust
adjudicative or semi-adjudicative body that satisfies our notions of
accountability. The proliferation of international courts and their kin
locally or globally - reflect these impulses. In the face of this trend toward
increased judicialization, this section suggests a different pathway for
accountability by illustrating the benefits of decentralized, dialogue-based
approaches. Such approaches certainly offer benefits for resolving disputes
between corporations and external stakeholders regarding human rights. It
may be worth exploring whether these approaches can offer similar benefits
in other contexts addressing international human rights.

VI. LIMITATIONS: THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
One potential concern with developing a framework for procedural
fairness is the wisdom and practicality of transplanting processes between
corporations operating in different value chains. Value chain characteristics
are certainly important. These characteristics affect (a) the nature of the
disputes that arise and (b) the types of external stakeholders involved.
In the extractive industries (such as oil and mining), the key external
stakeholders are the members of the local communities in which the
business enterprise operates. These individuals are not necessarily employed
by the business enterprise and may not take an active part in the enterprise's
value chain. As such, they may lack an employment or quasi-employment
relationship with the enterprise. Instead, their interest in the enterprise's
activities comes from their vulnerability to negative effects from the
business operation. The disputes that arise, therefore, concern the impact of
an enterprise's operations on the community's welfare, such as land
clearance, environmental damage, and security issues.
The situation is slightly different when we move from the extractive
industry to other value chains, such as agricultural, electronics, or garments.
Here, the key stakeholders are often the suppliers of large importing
companies in developed economies and the workers employed by those
suppliers. In these value chains, the contentious issues generally concern
labor, social, and environmental standards that govern the treatment of
workers in the value chain.
These differences necessarily lead to the question of whether successes
experienced by a company in one type of value chain can be replicated in
another. As explained below, value chain differences do not preclude the
applicability of procedural fairness strategies across value chains; however,
these differences do influence the likelihood that a corporation will invest in
procedural fairness.
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A. Applicability of ProceduralFairness
First, the framework for procedural fairness developed in this Article
builds upon the broad criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms set out
in the UN Guiding Principles on Business Rights ("UN Guiding
Principles") and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Operations. These
standards do not limit the criteria to particular value chains. Instead, under
Article 31 of the UN Guiding Principles, the seven effectiveness criteria are
intended for both State-based and non-State-based non-judicial grievance
mechanisms. 310 The only distinction recognized is the special situation of
operational-level grievance mechanisms, where engagement and dialogue
are recommended. 311
Second, the framework developed in this Article provides a wide margin
for adaptation in different contexts. The process for resolving secondary
conflicts does not need to be the same in all contexts - there simply needs
to be a process in place. Wilmar incorporated its process for secondary
conflict resolution in a Memorandum of Understanding that set out ground
rules for the dialogue process, including rules of conduct, decision-making
and how to overcome deadlock. 312 By contrast, Chevron used joint sessions
"to resolve impasses and disagreements." 313
Similarly, trust-building can also differ between contexts. For example,
Wilmar and Chevron both participated in joint problem solving exercises
with community members but these joint exercises differed because of the
issues in dispute. Wilmar participated in joint mapping exercises with
community members because much of the dispute concerned land rights.314
By contrast, Chevron engaged in a participatory stakeholder evaluation
involving representatives from the communities, local NGOs, the
government, and Chevron. 31 5 The purpose of this process was to evaluate
Chevron's first set of GMOUs and identify areas for improvement. 316

B. Investing in ProceduralFairness
Even if value chain differences do not affect the applicability of
procedural fairness, these differences do affect the likelihood that
companies will adopt procedural fairness for the following three reasons:
economic value of procedural fairness, susceptibility to external drivers, and
centralization/decentralization of dispute resolution.
310. Guiding Princpleson.Business andHuman Rzghts, supra note 6, at 26.

311. Id. at T 31(h).
312.
313.
314.
315.

CAO Report, supra note 238, at 3-4.
Hoben, Kovick, Plumb & Wright, supranote 162, at 9.
CAO Report, sepra note 238, at 1.
Hoben, Kovick, Plumb & Wright, stpra note 162, at 8.

316. Id
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The level of trust that a grievance mechanism commands is a result of
the processes that created it. It is more likely to be trusted and used if its
institutional design process is perceived as fair. But a company's willingness
to invest in fair procedures also varies and depends on how much effective
dispute resolution matters to its economic interests. Critically, the economic
value of procedural fairness depends on whether a corporation can escape
disputes in its value chain or if it must address them. A corporation will
invest in superior dispute resolution mechanisms and adopt fair procedures
if it must confront the disputes that occur in its value chain. Value chain
characteristics determine whether a company can flee a dispute or is forced
to confront it.

The first value chain characteristic that matters relates to substitution
possibilities for the resources in the value chain. A transnational
corporation's commitment to a region is linked to its ability to source
elsewhere. The differences in the quality of the dispute resolution methods
used can therefore be partially explained with reference to a company's
substitution possibilities and the risk of supply interruptions. When
resources are fixed and substitution is unlikely, companies are more likely to
invest in better dispute resolution because they cannot run away from those
disputes. In these situations, companies take the region as they find it and
must work with the local communities and NGOs to resolve the disputes.
For example, Chevron's history in the Niger Delta went back over forty
years before the first GMOUs were negotiated. This history had withstood
several challenges, and Chevron was not going to leave the area. Not every
company has such an enduring stake in the outer posts of its global value
chain. Confronted with supply interruptions or an imminent public relations
crisis, many companies simply abandon their operations in the "problem"
317
region and re-locate to another location.
Corporate commitment to engagement also grows when there are
significant risks and consequences associated with unresolved conflicts,
such as the conflict in the Niger Delta that suspended Chevron's operations.
The corporate project of dispute resolution becomes even more significant
when local governments lack the capacity to address these disputes. These

317. The fear of flight in the wake of a value chain crisis - or in the response to it - is the
reason why multi-stakeholder agreements include "anti-flight" provisions. See Bangladesh Accord, supra
note 282, at ¶ 25 ("Signatory companies to this agreement are committed to maintaining long-term
sourcing relationships with Bangladesh, as is demonstrated by their commitment to this five-year
programme. Signatory companies shall continue business at order volumes comparable to or greater
than those that existed in the year preceding the inception of this Agreement with Tier 1 and Tier 2
factories at least through the first two years of the term of this Agreement, provided that (a) such
business is commercially viable for each company and (b) the factory continues to substantially meet
the company's terms and comply with the company's requirements of its supplier factories under this
agreement.").
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economic factors may explain why many currently available operation-level
grievance mechanisms are in extractive-sector value chains: BTC Pipeline
(oil), Xstrata (copper), Carbones del Cerrejon (coal), Sakhalin Energy (oil
and gas), and Chevron (oil).318 The International Council of Mining and

Metals (ICMM) provides its members with detailed procedures for
establishing credible grievance mechanisms. 319
Under this value chain analysis, it is not surprising that the quality of
dispute resolution therefore dwindles when the substitution possibilities
increase and the supply chain risks decrease. Retailers in the garment
industry have more options for sourcing. Additionally, the disputes at issue
- factory-level issues between workers and managers - may not threaten
widespread supply interruptions as in the Niger Delta. Here, the substitution
possibilities are considerable so a company may not need to address local
conflicts. They can simply take flight. The humbling insight is that although
fair processes facilitate trust, economic interests facilitate fair processes, at
least in the commercial context. Even if companies understand how to
adopt fair processes, their investment in fair procedures depends on the
economic value of that trust.
Another consequence of value chain differences is relative susceptibility
to external drivers for dispute resolution. As discussed in Section IV, supra,
one set of drivers come from financial institutions, such as the commercial
banks that have signed onto the Equator Principles. 320 Therefore, a
company's susceptibility to these drivers depends on whether it is dependent
upon such financing arrangements.
A second driver for improved corporate practices generally is consumer
preferences in developed markets. Certain industries, such as brand
electronics and garments, seem particularly susceptible to market incentives
created by such preferences, such as anti-sweatshop media campaigns and
consumer boycotts. This susceptibility to consumer preferences is more
pronounced in these industries than extractive industries where demand is
more fixed. However, despite this susceptibility, there appears to be less
activity in the former industries regarding dispute resolution within their
value chains. This may reflect the lack of consumer education regarding the
importance of dispute resolution and subsequent lack of consumer demand
for it.
Finally, value chain differences may affect the extent of centralization in
resolving disputes within value chains. Where similar disputes arise between
318. Retail value chains have also been active, with grievance mechanisms adopted by Gap,
Hewlett Packard, and Esquel Garments Vietnam. PiloingPrinciles,supra note 51, at 31. One driver for
the use of grievance mechanisms here may be reputational risks for brand name retailers.

319. ICMM, supra note 4.
320. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

2016]

THE STEWARDSHIP OF TRUST

645

a group of stakeholders and one firm, we may expect to see greater
decentralization of dispute resolution and the predominance of companylevel grievance mechanisms. For example, a great deal of the research on
best practices regarding operation-level grievance mechanisms comes from
321
value chains in the extractive industry.
Where disputes arise between stakeholders and a number of different
companies, it is likely that these companies will adopt industry or multiindustry dispute resolution platforms. In electronic and garment value
chains, large first-tier suppliers often take orders from several different
clients.322 Therefore, labor disputes that arise between workers and suppliers
may often implicate more than one company. In these situations, it is more
likely that companies will use dispute resolution mechanisms offered
through organizations like the Fair Labor Association or the Ethical Trading
Initiative.
CONCLUSION

-

This Article argues that the level of trust that stakeholders place in a
dispute resolution mechanism does not only result from its attributes during
its operational stage when it is used to resolve grievances that have arisen
between parties. Instead, the trust that claimants and other stakeholders
place in the mechanism also depends on the process of its creation
institutional design - and whether this process built trust between the
stakeholders involved.
Under a stewardship approach to trust-building, a corporation or other
business enterprise should treat each stage of institutional development as a
site for trust-building between itself and its local suppliers, workers, and
community members. Stakeholder engagement should occur during each of
these stages but should not be relied upon exclusively to build the desired
trust. Instead, corporate actors should be prepared for conflict during the
process of stakeholder engagement. They should distinguish between
conflicts about non-compliance with applicable standards (primay conflicts)
and conflicts about the content of those standards and their enforcement
(seconday conflicts). Corporations should focus on resolving both primary and
secondary conflicts in order to build effective trust between the parties.

321. For example, the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues
(IPIECA) has already produced a good practices survey on operation-level grievance mechanisms.
Operational Level Grievance Mechanisms: IPIECA Good Practice Survy, IPIECA (2012), available at
It
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/operational-level-grievance-mechanisms-good-practice-survey.
will shortly release a report on its pilot study of grievance mechanisms. The International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM) also released a study on designing and operating grievance mechanisms.
ICMM, supra note 4; see also PilotingPrinciples, supra note 51.
322. See Helle Bank Jorgenson et al., supra note 61.
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Disagreements may occur but what is vital is that there is a strategy in
place to address these disagreements and that this strategy is perceived as
acceptable by those stakeholders participating in the institutional design
process. Critically, parties can facilitate trust-building through contracting
strategies. The contracting process can establish a foundation of informal
norms upon which the parties' exchange relationship is based. Here,
contracting performs an instrumental role by endogenizing trust within
relationships.
As a result, the level of trust that characterizes the relationship between
the parties is not a given. Instead, it is also a product of the process of
institutional design. The level of trust that stakeholders place in a dispute
resolution mechanism is influenced by the trust-building that does or does
not occur during that mechanism's institutional design stage. Building trust
during this process can increase the trust and legitimacy that the resulting
grievance mechanism commands. It may even decrease the likelihood of
disputes between the parties. This insight has significant implications for
public and private institutional development in comparable settings. It
suggests that actors should consider opportunities for trust-building during
the entire institutional development process and not focus exclusively on
the operational stage. Second, this insight also suggests an alternative
approach to international accountability that favors decentralization and
non-judicialization and the benefits of decentralized, dialogue-based
approaches to human rights violations by corporations.

